Originally published by The Legal Intelligencer
On its one-year anniversary, the sweeping health care reform law
— referred to as the "Affordable Care Act"
(ACA) if you like it, and "Obamacare" if you don't
— is embroiled in litigation. Its fate, like that of the
2000 presidential election, is likely to be determined by the
Supreme Court.
Five key decisions have been rendered in separate lawsuits
— brought by a host of individual citizens, states,
academic institutions and foundations — challenging the
"mandate" that all individuals either must purchase
"minimum essential coverage" (MEC) by Jan. 1, 2014, or
pay a tax penalty (of approximately $695 per person). The nub of
the commerce clause issue is whether regulating a decision not to
purchase health insurance exceeds the outer bounds of congressional
authority under the commerce clause (U.S. Const. art. 1 § 1
cl. 8). Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that the penalty
provision is not a valid exercise of the taxing power and therefore
does not survive independently as a tax enacted for the general
welfare under the Constitution's taxing and spending clause
(U.S. Const., Art. 1 § 8 cl. 3).
Two district court decisions by Republican appointees, State of
Florida v. Sebelius (Judge Roger Vinson) and Virginia ex
rel Cuccinelli v. Sebelius (Judge Henry E. Hudson), awarded
summary judgment to plaintiffs. Three decisions issued by
Democratic appointees for the federal district courts of
Washington, D.C. ( Liberty Univ. v. Geithner ), the
Western District of Virginia ( Mead v. Holder ), and the
Eastern District of Michigan ( Thomas More Law Center v.
Obama ), all dismissed plaintiffs' claims on the pleadings
upon finding as a matter of law that the individual mandate, taken
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce and is
sustainable under evolving commerce clause jurisprudence.
The decisions ruling in favor of and against the ACA on commerce
clause grounds are separated by a gaping doctrinal divide. The
Florida and Virginia courts concluded, respectively, that requiring
someone to buy insurance is not regulation of commerce, but rather
"the regulation of a mental act" and "compel[ling]
an involuntary act" — a result that could not have
been envisioned by the framers of the Constitution (who, as set
forth in James Madison's articles and essays in "The
Federalist," intended to strictly limit enumerated federal
powers and leave "residual" powers in the hands of the
people and the states). Both courts concluded that the statutory
remedy for noncompliance is an unconstitutional "penalty"
(as described, expressly, by the ACA) because the assessment levied
for a failure to purchase MEC serves to enforce a statute that is
not itself validly based on an "enumerated power."
Because it is a "penalty" rather than a tax, the Florida
and Virginia courts further held that assessments imposed for
noncompliance with the individual mandate could not pass
constitutional muster in the alternative as a tax levied for the
general welfare. Plaintiffs also argued that if it was a tax, the
assessment for noncompliance was not a properly apportioned direct
tax. No court yet has seen the need to decide this issue.
A less publicized aspect of the Florida decision was the
court's rejection of 10th Amendment and abuse-of-commerce
clause challenges advanced by the states against provisions of the
ACA that dramatically expanded Medicaid coverage. Notably, the
Florida suit was brought on behalf of 26 states. For many, the
challenge to the individual mandate may have been a stalking horse
for contesting budget-busting provisions of the ACA that
dramatically expanded the scope of, and the states' financial
obligations for, new jointly funded Medicaid program entitlements.
Thus, the ACA obligated states to maintain pre-existing levels of
Medicaid eligibility and widely extended Medicaid benefits to
include all people (including childless adults) with incomes under
133 percent of the federal poverty level. On this issue, Vinson
sided with Kathleen Sebelius — the secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services and the defendant in the
lawsuit — concluding that the "voluntary"
nature of a state's Medicaid participation precludes a viable
10th Amendment claim, and that the ACA is not unlawful as a
"coercive" exercise of commerce clause power under the
test enumerated in South Dakota v. Dole.
Under the Florida decision, however, the states get to eat their
cake without having it because Vinson also found the individual
mandate too crucial to the overall purpose of the reform law to be
"severed" from the remainder of the statute, and
accordingly, declared the ACA invalid in its entirety. In contrast,
Hudson concluded in the Virginia case that it was impossible to
tell whether Congress would have enacted the remaining provisions
of the law without the individual mandate. Accordingly, he followed
the more traditional and well-beaten prudential path of severing
the invalid provision, and leaving the remainder of the ACA
intact.
While declaring the ACA invalid, Vinson declined to enter an
injunction against its implementation, prompting some states to
take matters into their own hands and proclaim their intentions not
to comply with its other requirements or deadlines. This in turn
prompted the Justice Department to seek a "clarification"
— which Vinson treated as a request for a stay of his
order. After berating the government for its intentional
non-acquiescence in his declaratory order — albeit in the
face of three decisions upholding the law, and the court's own
prior declination to enjoin affirmatively its implementation
— Vinson nevertheless stayed his own order, subject to
the government's filing an immediate appeal and requesting
expedition by the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, or seeking
immediate review under Supreme Court Rule 11. In so ruling, Vinson
recognized the harm and widespread programmatic disruption that
would attend an injunction. Most interestingly, the March 30 order
concluded that defendants had a "probability" of
prevailing on the merits on appeal, given evolving and expanding
concepts of commerce clause jurisprudence.
A study in contrast, the three district court cases that rejected
commerce clause challenges to the individual mandate eschewed the
characterization of the mandate as "metaphysical"
regulation of individual behavior, finding instead that refraining
from purchasing insurance is inherently economic activity that,
when "aggregated," materially affects interstate
commerce. These courts assumed, based on the legislative findings
and statistics enumerated in the ACA, that Congress had rationally
concluded that individuals who refrain from purchasing health
insurance nonetheless actively participate in the health services
market by consuming hospital emergency services. As a result,
refraining from buying insurance (i.e., intentional
nonparticipation in the health insurance market) is itself a form
of "economic activity" (i.e., a decision about how to pay
for health care services that are likely to be consumed, with or
without insurance). Aside from "shifting" the costs of
unpaid health care services to health care providers and those
actually paying for insurance, the courts finding a substantial
impact on interstate commerce also agreed that, because the ACA
precludes insurers from denying coverage based upon pre-existing
illnesses, limiting lifetime benefits, or using community ratings
to determine eligibility for coverage, the mandate to procure MEC
or pay a monthly penalty for not doing so logically serves to
prevent individuals (in the aggregate) from waiting to buy
insurance until they are sick, and otherwise undermining the
underwriting soundness of the health insurance market.
Expedited appeals presently are pending in the 4th, 6th and 11th
Circuits. Having previously denied a request for direct
interlocutory review of one court's dismissal of a challenge to
the ACA on standing grounds, the Supreme Court currently has before
it the state of Virginia's petition for direct review under
Supreme Court Rule 11 of Hudson's decision to "sever"
the individual mandate. On March 14, the solicitor general opposed
Virginia's petition for direct review, citing the value of
allowing the issues to be considered in the first instance by the
courts of appeals and the fact that the individual mandate does not
go into effect until 2014, by which time the issue will be subject
to timely review the ordinary course following expedited
consideration by several courts of appeals.
Whether a majority of the Supreme Court decides to grant immediate
review, or declines to hear the case until after the passage of
time during which the states are required to implement
"insurance exchanges" and otherwise comply with a host of
ACA requirements may itself speak volumes. (Of course, the
implementation of the law also results in the immediate
availability of small business tax credits and health care coverage
for children.)
An intriguing aspect of the challenge to the ACA, whenever it is
heard, is the role of prior commerce clause precedents with factual
scenarios ranging from the regulation of private intrastate growth
of marijuana, to gun control. The most prominent cases applying the
aggregate impact theory include Gonzales v. Raich , a 2005
opinion in which the Supreme Court held, by a 6-3 vote, that
provisions of the Controlled Substances Act prohibiting the private
growth of medical marijuana for individual personal consumption was
a valid exercise of the commerce clause power. Raich was
authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, and joined in by Justices
Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
Breyer. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in the result. He rejected
the theory that activities that "substantially affect"
interstate commerce are part of interstate commerce, but rested on
the conclusion that Congress may regulate activities that solely
affect intrastate commerce if they are "necessary and
proper" to effectively regulate interstate commerce, and are
authorized under Art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 of the
Constitution.
Raich was built on the foundation of Wickard v.
Fulburn , in a which a unanimous 1942 Supreme Court upheld a
restriction under the Agriculture Adjustment Act on the growth of
wheat for "personal consumption." Scalia framed the
Wickard ruling as a case where controlling
"unregulated production" for personal consumption was
necessary and proper to avoid "diminished demand" in the
regulated interstate market. By a similar token, the regulation of
the "non-insurance buying market" could be characterized
as ensuring necessary demand in the regulated interstate insurance
market. That, of course, does not address the more fundamental
philosophical question of whether the framers envisioned using the
commerce clause to regulate what might be cast as "economic
inactivity."
Two other relatively recent decisions in which the Supreme Court
found commerce clause boundaries to have been crossed and that play
prominently in the constitutional debate involved federal laws
prohibiting the possession of firearms within school zones (
United States v. Lopez , a 1995 decision by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Clarence Thomas; Kennedy concurring), and
violence against women ( United States v. Morrison ,
majority decision by Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas; Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer,
dissenting).
The gravamen of the majority decisions in these cases was that
Congress was attempting to regulate local criminal activity that
was not economic in nature and that had only the most attenuated,
if any, commercial implications.
To sum up, the Supreme Court has firmly recognized Congress'
authority under the commerce clause to regulate purely intrastate
or even private economic activity that, indirectly, has a
substantial affect on interstate commerce when taken in the
aggregate. It is difficult to conceive that a mass failure to enter
the insurance market, which results in annual health care cost
shifting— is properly characterized as "economic
activity." This being an issue that yielded 100 percent
alignment of Republican jurists against Democratic jurists, one
might expect a similar outcome before the Supreme Court. This could
be yet another pivotal vote for Justice Kennedy!
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