A United Airlines, Inc. flight attendant sustained severe head injuries while working on a flight from Massachusetts to Virginia. While she was trying to stow her emergency demonstration equipment in a compartment below one of two side-by-side jump seats, another flight attendant "stood up from the second jump seat, causing that jump seat to retract, striking Plaintiff in the face and knocking her backward against the bulkhead." The flight attendant sued Airbus Americas, Inc. ("AAI") and Airbus S.A.S., Inc. ("Airbus S.A.S.") in New York federal court, alleging that they leased the A320S aircraft to United and negligently designed and installed its jump seats.
The case was dismissed because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Airbus defendants. A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation—which allows the court to adjudicate any claim against the corporation, even those unrelated to the corporation's contacts with New York—if the corporation's contacts with the state "are so continuous and systematic" that it is "essentially at home" in New York. For the most part, that is at the defendant's place of incorporation or principal place of business—neither of which was New York for either defendant. As such, the question was whether the court had specific jurisdiction over them.
A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant only if the plaintiff's claims arise from the defendant's contacts with the forum state. New York's specific jurisdiction "long-arm" statute, CPLR § 302(a), provides:
[A] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an agent: (1) transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or (2) commits a tortious act within the state ... or (3) commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state ... if he (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that her claims arose from the Airbus entities transacting business in New York (CPLR § 302(a)(1)) or from their commission of a tortious act outside of New York that caused injury in New York (CPLR § 302(a)(3)).
With respect to CPLR § 302(a)(1), the plaintiff argued that the defendants' internet advertising in the US provided a basis for jurisdiction. New York law is clear, however, that internet advertising in the US (even if it is specifically targeted to New York) is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction without a showing of more significant business transactions or that the defendants maintained "permanence and continuity" in New York.
The plaintiff also found no basis for CPLR § 302(a)(3) jurisdiction, which requires a tortious act outside of New York that caused injury in New York. Under New York's "situs of injury" test, "the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are felt by the plaintiff" is determinative. Here, because the flight attendant did not allege that her injury occurred in any particular state (and it most likely occurred near the beginning of the flight in Massachusetts), there was no basis for jurisdiction in New York.
Merritt v. Airbus Americas, Inc., 2016 WL 4483623 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2016).
Flight Attendant's Action Against Airbus Dismissed For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction
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