Central Vigilance Commission – Evolution From A Non-Statutory To A Statutory Body

Meta Title: The article studies the creation of the Central Vigilance Commission and its transition from a non-statutory body to a statutory body.

Meta Description: Corruption is the leading problem plaguing the administration of the country. hence to review activities of the administration and combat corruption, the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) was created by the Government of India. But the question remains if in the last 6 decades, the goals and functioning of the commission has actually brought any result or impact on the rampant corruption cases that still persist leading to maladministration. The article shall answer the same and recommend contemporary solutions to aid the commission uproot corruption.

Introduction

In the context of any organisation, vigilance would entail keeping a close check on the officers' and officials' activities to guarantee personnel integrity in their official operations. In order to maintain efficacy and effectiveness of employees and the organisation, vigilance is to assure clear and timely administrative action. Lack of vigilance leads to losses in terms of deterioration of economic security.

Keywords: Administrative action, Central Vigilance Commission, Maladministration, Non-Statutory and Statutory.

The above pie chart represents the condition of the nation, whereby the maximum corruption is led by central and state level government officials followed by city officials and political parties.

An unfavourable environment for the correct assessment of individual complaints against the administration is frequently created by the emergence of party discipline and the predominance of partisan attitudes in Ministers' assertions of grievances and defences of the performance of the administrations. No matter how inefficient, this system absolutely collapses when inertia and corruption start at the top. In light of this, the Santhanam Committee's "Committee on Prevention of Corruption", established in 1962, proposed the creation of the Central Vigilance Commission (herein after 'CVC'). As a result of the government accepting the Santhanam Committee's recommendations, CVC was constituted as a non-statutory body by Resolution No. 24/7/64 dated February 11, 1964.

Critical Analysis

Sanctioning Prosecution

As per Article 309 of the Indian Constitution, disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against government servants, in addition to prosecuting them for bribery or corruption in a criminal court. Before a government servant can be prosecuted, Section 17¹ of the Prevention of Corruption Act acts as a safeguards against false trials under which sanction of the State Government that is an administrative function deems to be necessary. During the course of investigation, accumulated facts are presented before the sanctioning authority, whereby grant of sanction being an administrative act does not provide the accused the chance to present his side.²

In the case of Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad v. State of Andhra Pradesh³ the Supreme Court has emphasised on two momentous aspects of "sanction for prosecution". Any case that is brought without the requisite sanction, must collapse since, as without a sanction the entire procedure stands to be null and invalid. Therefore, the prosecution must establish that the sanctioning authority has issued a legitimate sanction. The sanctioning authority must also be convinced that an offence has been established that justifies a punishment. The sanctioning body must use its judgement and be aware of the circumstances surrounding the offence at the time it imposes the sentence. The sanctioning process is not only a formality. The government employees are protected by this sacred law against frivolous charges. The sanctioning authority must be presented with all the evidence supporting the offence before it may decide that it is satisfied to grant one.

In another case of RS Nayak v. AR Antulay⁴, the Supreme Court answered an interesting question pertaining to corruption and sanctioning of prosecution. In this case Antulay obtained funds by setting up trusts under his official function while he was the Chief Minister, but during the trial he was a Member of the Legislative Assembly demanding the issuance of sanction for to prosecute him.

On the day that the Court took cognizance of Antulay's prosecution, he was no longer a public employee since he had left the Chief Minister's office. For the purposes of Section 21⁵ of the Indian Penal Code, which defines a public servant, a member of a state legislature cannot be considered a public servant. Therefore, it was once again decided that those who are accused of having committed crimes while serving as ministers do not need sanction for prosecution after leaving office, even if they may continue to serve as Member of Legislative Assembly.⁶

The case of Antulay⁷ is significant because it is the first official criminal prosecution on a private complaint against a public figure for actions taken while he was in office and accused of corruption. Such accusations against State Ministers have been made on several times in the past. The majority of these situations were handled on an ad-hoc basis, without any established procedure for addressing them. After observations were made about them in court judgements, certain Ministers resigned from their positions. To determine if there was any prima-facie evidence against the Minister in question, inquiry officers were occasionally chosen by administrative decisions.⁸

In a very recent case of Vijay Rajmohan v. State⁹ decided in October 2022, the Supreme Court pronounced that delay in prosecuting the officer charged with corruption breeds a culture of further indirectly promoting impunity and such inaction leads to acceptance of corruption by the common man as a way of life. The court in furtherance of which held that the Sanction requests must be complied with in less than 4 months, but also non-compliance of which would not automatically lead to quashing of the proceedings as it prevails in public interest with a direct bearing on the rule of law.¹⁰

Interpretation of this case provides us with the crucial understating of the fact that if sanctions are withheld or not granted with baseless reasons which result into repressing genuine corruption cases then the CVC may exercise its power by inquiring and taking up correction actions as empowered under the provisions of Section 8 (1) (e) and(f)¹¹ of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.

Special Courts

To combat misuse of power entitled to high public/ political offices, the Special Courts Act, 1979¹² was enacted to decongest ordinary criminal courts, speedy termination of public servant offenders and efficient functioning of the parliamentary democracy and constitutional institutions. A prima facie declaration by the central government of evidence of commission of an offence by the public servant, such prosecution was to be instituted in a Special Court. This Special Court was to follow the ordinary criminal procedure that had the right to appeal to the Supreme Court.

This Act was then challenged whereby, the Supreme Court upheld its constitutional validity¹³ which was later scrutinized in the case if State (Delhi Administration) v. VC Shukla¹⁴ where the contention raised was making this bill into a permanent statute violated Article 14¹⁵ on the grounds of lack of classification. The court upheld the validity and stated that the act pertains to special classes of offences for people placed in a special class to maintain administrative efficiency.

The above discussion justifies the difficulties of operation without a non-statutory vigilance commission. Which led to the statutory birth of the Vigilance Commission.

Statutory Birth of the Vigilance Commission

It was in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. VC Shukla¹⁶ whereby the Supreme Court directed to make the Central Vigilance Commission a statutory body instead of a body operating out of notification. This judicial directive led to the enactment of the Central Vigilance Commissions Act, 2003[17] , preamble of which states that the act would inquire and investigate into subject matters and offences codified under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988¹⁸.

And since the enactment of the Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 2013¹⁹, the CVC Act is to be read with in consonance of this statute. Operating oversight the Lokpal Act for Group A and B officials and autonomous of Lokpal Act for Group C and D officials, pronouncing the basic structure to combat corruption. The two legislations have been normative resources that has aided the judiciary in upholding administrative function so as to drive for accountability.

The Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Bill, 2021

In December 2021, the bill was introduced with Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Bill, 2021, on account of extending Enforcement Directorate (ED) director and CBI Chief's tenure to maximum five years, for stability and enhanced regulation. The reasoning behind this amendment was stated by Minister of State for Personnel Jitendra Singh subjected to the thought that the head of an investigation agency stores information that is only pricy to him and if the head is changed in middle of a case being heard, it may lead to difficulties which may not only pertain to political influence but also tampering.²⁰

In my opinion, such amendments may not only:

• Enhance the quality of investigation as it will be based on a single perspective but also
• Speed up the trial;
• Introduce a sense of consistency and uniformity; and
• Uproot nepotism and disparity in bureaucracy.

But if we see it from a critical point of view, such amendment would also aid cases of corruption whereby:

• The parties to the case can bribe the same investigating officer:
• Reduces the possibility of check and balance, which may come in effect if different heads work on the same case.

Conclusion and Suggestion

To conclude, it is important to stress upon the fact that the digital age we live in sparks resources for financial crimes such as corruption, black money, frauds which are a threat to the financial security and structure of the nation. To overcome this, the author of the research paper suggests the below mentioned recommendations:

• The Vigilance Commissioner should be given the "Legal Status", whereby other provisions should have clauses to consult the commission in his legal capacity.
• Keeping in mind that the commission had played a non-statutory role for almost 4 decades, the commission should have special judges and specialized wing that would study the procedures and process of decision making, in a definite mechanism to combat corruption departments in the nation.
• The 2007 Report of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) identified the gap between the legal and institutional framework, in the area of whistle-blower protection. To contest this, the legislation came up with safeguards to protect the common man which would provide such whistle-blowers the motivation to raise alarm if they counter cases of corruption.²¹ But then arises the question of implementation as the legislation does not seem be actively used in practicality.
• Misappropriation of resources within the nation and across its borders requires a well-structured monitoring system, that has divisional and local bodies for enhanced vigilance and greater transparency as it would create the hierarchy of reporting to a higher authority.

References

Books/Articles/Research Papers

• P. Jain & S.N. Jain, "Principles of Administrative Law", Lexisnexis, 7^th Ed. (2017).
• P. Massey, "Administrative Law", Eastern Book Company, 9^th Ed, (2018).
• Sanjay Pande, & Neetu Jain, "Central Vigilance Commission: A Perspective Based on Historical Indian World View and Statecraft", Indian J. of Public Administration, Vol. 67 Issue (1), Pg. No. 117–125. https://doi.org/10.1177/00195561211010025
• Neeraj Singh Manhas & H. A. Mansuri, "Vigilance Awareness: Issues and Challenges", International Journal of Social Impact, Vol. 6 Issue 1, Pg. No. 44-47, DOI: 10.25215/2455/060106.
• Bhumika Indulia, "Bills seeking extension of tenure of Directors of ED and CBI introduced in Lok Sabha", SCC Online Blog, December 6, 2021, https://www-scconline-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/blog/post/2021/12/06/bills-seeking-extension-of-tenure-of-directors-of-ed-and-cbi-introduced-in-lok-sabha/
• Prachi Bhardwaj, "'Delays in prosecuting the corrupt breeds a culture of impunity'; Sanction requests under PC Act must be decided within 4 months but proceedings cannot be quashed for delay: SC", SCC Online Blog, October 13, 2022, https://www-scconline-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/blog/post/2022/10/13/prevention-of-corruption-delay-in-deciding-sanction-request-no-quashment-time-limit-4-months-mandatory-supreme-court-legal-research-updates-news/
• Central Vigilance Commission, https://cvc.gov.in/
• Biplab Kumar Lenin, "Administration of Central Vigilance Commission: A critical Analysis", Manupatra, 30 July 2018, http://www.manupatra.com/roundup/328/Articles/Administration%20of%20Central%20Vigilance.pdf
• PTI, "Parliament passes bill to extend CBI directors' tenure up to a maximum of five years", Economic Times, Dec 14, 2021, 07:53 PM IST, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/parliament-passes-bill-to-extend-cbi-directors-tenure-up-to-max-5-years/articleshow/88276869.cms

Legislations

• The Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003, (Act No. 45 of 2003).
• The Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, (Act No. 49 of 1988).
• The Special Courts Act, 1979 (Act No. 22 of 1979).
• The Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Bill, 2021 (Act No. 9 Of 2021).
• Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 2013, (Act No. 1 of 2014).
• The Whistle BLOWERS' Protection Act, 2014 (Act No. 17 Of 2014).

Footnotes

1. § 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (ACT NO. 49 OF 1988).

2. Superintendent of Police (CAI) v. Deepak Chowdhary, (1995) 6 SCC 225.

3. Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 677.

4. R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183.

5. § 21of the Indian Penal Code 1980, (Act No. 45 of 1860).

6. Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1.

7. R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183.

8. Harekrishna Mahtab v. Chief Minister, Orissa, AIR 1971 Ori. 175.

9. Vijay Rajmohan v. State, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1377.

10. Prachi Bhardwaj, "'Delays in prosecuting the corrupt breeds a culture of impunity'; Sanction requests under PC Act must be decided within 4 months but proceedings cannot be quashed for delay: SC", SCC Online Blog, October 13, 2022, https://www-scconline-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/blog/post/2022/10/13/prevention-of-corruption-delay-in-deciding-sanction-request-no-quashment-time-limit-4-months-mandatory-supreme-court-legal-research-updates-news/

11. § 8 (1) (e) & (f) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003, (Act No. 45 of 2003).

12. The Special Courts Act, 1979 (Act No. 22 of 1979)

13. In Re: The Special Courts Bill, AIR 1979 SC 478.

14. State (Delhi Administration) v. V.C. Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 1382.

15. India Const., Art. 14.

16. Central Bureau of Investigation v. VC Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410.

17. The Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003, (Act No. 45 of 2003).

18. The Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, (Act No. 49 of 1988).

19. Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 2013, (Act No. 1 of 2014).

20. PTI, "Parliament passes bill to extend CBI directors' tenure up to a maximum of five years", Economic Times, Dec 14, 2021, 07:53 PM IST, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/parliament-passes-bill-to-extend-cbi-directors-tenure-up-to-max-5-years/articleshow/88276869.cms

21. The Whistle BLOWERS' Protection Act, 2014 (Act No. 17 Of 2014).

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