BAIL
S. 439, CRPC DOES NOT EMPOWER COURTS TO GRANT COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT
In the present case, the Allahabad High Court passed an order directing the Director of Narcotic Controls Bureau (NCB) to pay a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- for wrongful confinement under a bail application filed under S. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). During the pendency of the bail application before the High Court, NCB filed a closure report before the Special Judge NDPS, and the Respondent/Accused was released. The order passed by the Allahabad High Court was under challenge before the Supreme Court, where the court's observations were two-fold, firstly, that the bail application pending before the High Court had become infructuous since the District Court had already released the Respondent; secondly, that it is settled principle of law that the jurisdiction conferred upon a court under S. 439 of the CrPC is limited to grant or refusal of bail application. In view thereof, the Supreme Court held that the grant of compensation was without the authority of law and set aside the order of the High Court.
Union of India vs Man Singh Verma
BHARTIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA
POLICE IS EMPOWERED TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY IN OFFENCES PUNISHABLE WITH MORE THAN 3 YEARS BUT LESS THAN 7 YEARS EVEN IF INFORMATION RECEIVED DISCLOSES COGNIZABLE OFFENCE
In this case, an FIR was lodged against the Appellant, a Rajya Sabha MP for a poem recited in the background of a video clip posted by him on X (formerly known as twitter), that purportedly attracted offences against public tranquillity and hurt religious sentiments. The Supreme Court while quashing the FIR held that the investigating officer ought to have conducted a preliminary enquiry (“PE”) under S. 173(3) of the BNSS (the officer in charge of a police station can, with the prior permission of the DCP, conduct PE to ascertain if there exists a prima facie case relating to the commission of a cognizable offence which is made punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years) before proceeding with the registration of an FIR. The Court also distinguished Lalita Kumari case whereby a PE was made permissible in relation to S. 154(1), CrPC (akin to S. 173(1), BNSS) only if the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence, to interpret and hold that S. 173(3) is an exception to S. 173(1), empowering a police officer to conduct a PE to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out for proceeding in the matter even if the information received discloses commission of any cognizable offence. The Court further held that investigation being at a nascent stage, is not an embargo on the High Court's power to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or S. 528 of the BNSS and, prevent abuse of the process of law.
Imran Pratapgadhi vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
COURT HAS TO ASSESS A PRIMA FACIE CASE BEFORE GRANTING LEAVE UNDER SECTION 378(3), CRPC
In the present case, the State had challenged the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court before the Bombay High Court, which declined to grant leave under S. 378(3) of CrPC. However, instead of State challenging the order of the High Court, the first informant (brother of the deceased) filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that, while considering grant of leave under S. 378(3), CrPC, the Court should not ignore the materials on record and ought to have granted leave on its own merits. The Supreme Court while remitting the matter back to the High Court permitted the first informant to file an appeal under proviso to S. 372, CrPC, which shall be clubbed with the State's appeal and be heard together by the High Court.
Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya vs Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Anr.
PRIOR SANCTION MANDATORY FOR PROSECUTION AGAINST POLICE OFFICER FOR ACTS DONE IN EXCESS OF DUTY
The accused persons who were police officers challenged the order of cognizance for offences under Ss. 326, 358, 500, 501, 502 and 506(b) r/w S. 34 of IPC for want of prior sanction before initiating prosecution against them. The Supreme Court held that prior sanction under S. 197 of the CrPC and S. 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, 193 is mandatory before prosecuting the police officers. Relying on D. Devaraja vs Owais Sabeer Hussain [(2020) 7 SCC 695] and Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur vs. State of Mysore [1963 SC 849], the Court held that if there exists a reasonable nexus between the acts alleged and official duty, sanction is required even if the acts exceeded official authority. Only where the acts are manifestly beyond the scope of official duty or wholly unconnected thereto, prior sanction is obviated. In this case, since the allegations of physical assault and ill-treatment, wrongful confinement and criminal intimidation arose during a criminal investigation pending against the complainant, they were deemed to be within the ambit of “acts done under the colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority and acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty”. Accordingly, the Court quashed the proceedings.
G.C. Manjunath & Others v. Seetaram
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT
DEMAND AND ACCEPTANCE OF BRIBE MUST BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT TO SECURE CONVICTION UNDER THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988
In a trap case laid by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Appellants were convicted by the Trial Court under S. 7 and S. 13(1)(d) read with S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”). The conviction was upheld by the High Court. Consequently, the Appellants approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony regarding the alleged bribe demand in his original complaint and deposition in court and noted that the independent witnesses also turned hostile. The Court while setting aside the conviction of the Appellants held that the prosecution failed to establish the demand and acceptance of the illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt and thus, the question of presumption under S. 20 of the PC Act will not arise.
Madan Lal v. State of Rajasthan
FIR CAN BE REGISTERED AGAINST A PUBLIC SERVANT WITHOUT A PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY
The Supreme Court quashed the Karnataka High Court's order dismissing the proceedings initiated against a public servant under S. 13(1)(b) r/w S. 13(2) of the PC Act where no preliminary enquiry was conducted prior to registration of FIR. The Court held that preliminary enquiry is not mandatory in every case under the PC Act considering the judgment in the case of State of Karnataka vs. T.N Sudhakar Reddy [2025 SCC OnLine SC 382]. The Court held that in cases where the Superintendent of Police files a detailed report which discloses commission of cognizable offence, FIR can be registered based on the report without a preliminary enquiry. The Court further affirmed the judgment passed in CBI vs. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi [(2021) 18 SCC 135] that an accused public servant does not have an inherent right to be heard prior to filing of an FIR.
State of Karnataka v Sri Channakeshava H.D. & Anr.
MISCELLANEOUS
SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACTS IN A PRIVATE COMPLAINT IS AN ABUSE OF PROCESS OF LAW
In this case, a private complaint was filed by the Respondent – lender, for dishonour of a cheque under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 issued in pursuance to the discharge of a loan. In the complaint, material documents which could have led to the dismissal of the complaint were suppressed by the Respondent. The Supreme Court while quashing and setting aside the complaint and the order of cognizance held that criminal law set into motion based on a complaint/statement of oath suppressing material facts and documents, is an abuse of the process of law. The Court further observed that Magistrates are duty bound to put questions to the complainant to elicit the truth and apply his mind before issuing process.
Rekha Sharad Ushir vs. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd.
ARREST MEMO IS DIFFERENT FROM GROUNDS OF ARREST
The Supreme Court relying upon its decision in Prabir Purkayastha (reported here) – Please hyperlink ‘here' with May, 2024 Newsletter), set aside the arrest and the remand of the Appellant/Arrestee on the ground that grounds of arrest were not furnished to him. The Court held that the arrest memo furnished to the Appellant (which was only an intimation stating his name and that he was arrested based on the statement of co-accused) cannot be construed as grounds of arrest, as no particulars about the alleged crime were furnished to him.
Ashish Kakkar vs. UT of Chandigarh
DETENTION ORDER PASSED WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING BAIL FOR THE SAME OFFENCE LIABLE TO BE QUASHED
The Supreme Court set aside a preventive detention order and released the detenu, who was detained by the Detaining Authority under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (“COFEPOSA”) for his indulgence in smuggling activities, without considering that he was enlarged on bail by the Magistrate for the same offence. The Court further observed that the Detaining Authority ought to have considered the efficacy of the conditions of bail granted by the Magistrate and whether the same would be sufficient to restrain the detenu from indulging in further identical smuggling activities.
Joyi Joseph Kitty v. Union of India
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