INTRODUCTION
While Malaysia's competition law was perhaps rarely a key
consideration for many in the context of a merger and acquisition
("M&A") transaction happening in Malaysia, this may
be about to change if the ongoing talks about extending competition
law to cover mergers come to fruition.
As background, the primary competition legislation in Malaysia,
namely the Competition Act 2010 (the "Competition Act"),
came into force on 1 January 2012, and applies to any commercial
activity that has an effect on competition in any market inside
Malaysia. While the Competition Act contains prohibitions on
anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance, it has no
provisions on merger control.
The competition law enforcement authority in Malaysia, the Malaysia
Competition Commission ("MyCC"), is currently the only
competition authority in Southeast Asia without the power to
regulate M&As. Based on news reports, however, it is understood
that the MyCC has begun the process of amending the Competition Act
to incorporate power to regulate M&As in Malaysia. It has been
said that this may be implemented in the first-half 2020.
WHY IS "MERGER CONTROL" RELEVANT TO M&As?
The purpose of merger control
Merger control refers to a set of procedures for reviewing
M&As under competition law. Over 130 countries have merger
control laws and the majority of such jurisdictions have mandatory
merger control systems i.e. when filing of a transaction is
compulsory. This allows regulators to review in advance whether a
proposed M&A will have significant anti-competitive effects on
competition before a transaction is implemented. Compliance with
such procedures is therefore important because before completion
can take place, certain M&A transactions may need to be
notified to and/or approved by competition authorities in a number
of different jurisdictions.
Suspensory effect
In the context of a mandatory merger control regime, if parties
fail to notify a transaction before completion, and that failure
comes to the attention of the competition authority, the
transaction may be declared invalid and fines for non-compliance
can be significant. Even if the non-notified transaction does not
come to the attention of the relevant competition authority, a
failure to notify can also affect the validity of the transaction
as a whole. The risk of this is particularly high where multiple
competition authorities are involved. This is because competition
authorities often liaise with each other in reviewing transactions
and the notification procedure in certain jurisdictions may require
the disclosure of all competition authorities to whom the
transaction will be notified.
As a result, there will typically be a gap between signing and
completion of a transaction while merger clearances are obtained.
In this interim period, the buyer may incur costs in maintaining
financing for the transaction until completion. More crucially,
parties can also be exposed to significant risks, including changes
in market conditions and a deterioration of the target's
business and its relationship with its customers and suppliers. It
is therefore advisable for parties to take proactive steps to
address merger control issues at an early stage in order to reduce
the duration of merger control processes.
Transaction timing
The period for a party to obtain merger control clearance will
depend on a number of factors such as the requirements in each
jurisdiction and the complexity of the transaction. In general,
transactions can be subject to either one or two phases of review,
depending on whether there is any competition issue raised.
Transactions which do not raise significant competition law
concerns (or if such competition concerns are likely to be remedied
by commitments) will typically be cleared during a first phase
review which takes up to 4 weeks in most jurisdictions. More
problematic transactions can be subject to a lengthier second phase
review of up to 32 weeks. It is therefore essential for parties to
obtain advice at an early stage on the implications of merger
control requirements and assess if a lengthy merger control process
is envisaged. This will facilitate determination of certain terms
of the transaction documentation such as an appropriate long stop
date for the transaction.
Structural changes to the transaction
Where a competition authority considers that a M&A transaction
will result in significant anti-competitive effects, it can require
the parties involved to enter into commitments to remedy those
anti-competitive effects. An example of these commitments can be
found in acquisition of Spectrum Brands Holdings, Inc by Energizer
Holdings, Inc whereby the merged entity would become the largest
supplier of batteries and related products in several countries in
the European Economic Area. To address competition concerns raised
by the European Commission, the applicants proposed commitments,
which were accepted by the Commission, to divest certain regional
business of the target and to enter into exclusive supply and
licence agreement with purchaser of such regional business
(Case M.8988 Energizer/Spectrum Brands
(Battery and Portable Lighting Business). In the event merger
clearance is required from several competition authorities, diverse
commitments may also be imposed by different competition
authorities to address competition concerns in each jurisdiction.
Parties will need to ensure that they are in a position to
implement such commitments across a global framework and ensure
compliance with the different requirements in each
jurisdiction.
A competition authority can also prohibit a transaction which will
result in significant anti-competitive effects entirely. Based on
publicly available information, at least 29 M&A transactions
with a value of at least EUR46.3 billion were prohibited or
abandoned in major jurisdictions in 2018 as a result of competition
law intervention. Hence, parties should assess at the outset
whether a transaction is likely to have an impact on competition in
the relevant jurisdictions and perhaps whether a buyer would rather
look at more "competition-law friendly" targets. This
will enable them to take steps to mitigate any costs and adverse
impacts of merger control processes.
EXISTING MERGER CONTROL REGIMES IN MALAYSIA
Notwithstanding the lack of generic merger control provisions
applicable to all industries under the Competition Act, there are
sector-specific laws and guidelines that regulate mergers in the
context of competition law. These sectors are aviation services and
the communications and multimedia sectors, enforced by the
Malaysian Aviation Commission ("MAVCOM"), and the
Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission
("MCMC") respectively.
Aviation services sector
The Malaysia Aviation Commission Act 2015 ("MACA") is
presently the only statutory merger control regime in Malaysia.
Apart from also dealing with anti-competitive agreements (section
49) and abuse of dominant position (section 53), section 54 of the
MACA states that any mergers which 'have resulted, or may be
expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competition in
any aviation service market' is prohibited.
According to the MACA, a merger occurs if:
- two or more enterprises, previously independent of one another, merge;
- one or more persons or enterprises acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or part of one or more enterprises;
- the result of an acquisition by one enterprise of the assets (including goodwill), or a substantial part of the assets, of another enterprise is to place the first-mentioned enterprise in a position to replace or substantially replace the second-mentioned enterprise in the business or, as appropriate, the part concerned of the business in which the second-mentioned enterprise was engaged immediately before the acquisition; or
- a joint venture is created to perform, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.
The MACA merger control is a voluntary regime. Accordingly, for notification and assessment of a merger, parties should self-assess whether a merger can result in a substantial lessening of competition within any market affecting Malaysia, and whether a merger notification should be made to MAVCOM. MAVCOM is more likely to investigate a merger or proposed merger where:
- the combined turnover of the merger parties in Malaysia in the financial year preceding the transaction is at least RM50 million; or
- the combined worldwide turnover of the merger parties in the financial year preceding the transaction is at least RM500 million.
Communications and multimedia sector
The communications and multimedia sector in Malaysia is regulated
by the MCMC under the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998
("CMA"). The existing Guideline on Substantial Lessening
of Competition issued by the MCMC expressly states that the
regulator considers that mergers involving telecommunications and
multimedia licensees must be investigated as 'conduct which has
the purpose of substantially lessening competition in a
communications market' (under section 133 of the CMA). The
definition of a merger is similar to that set out in the
MACA.
As the CMA does not contain any express provisions for merger
control and assessment, there is no process nor is there a legal
requirement that parties to a merger or acquisition should notify
the MCMC in respect of such transactions. Despite the lack of clear
provisions under the CMA, section 140 of the CMA broadly allows a
licensee to seek the MCMC's prior approval of any proposed
merger. If the merger is implemented without seeking the MCMC's
approval under section 140, the MCMC may initiate an investigation
on its own accord if it is of the view that the merger would result
or has resulted in a substantial lessening of competition in the
market. The recent Guidelines issued by the MCMC on Mergers and
Acquisitions and Authorisation of Conduct introduced two routes
that a licensee may take in relation to clearance of a merger: (a)
notification to obtain MCMC's views in respect of the
competitive effects of a merger or acquisition (where the applicant
receives a no-objection or objection letter, as the case may be);
and (b) authorisation of a merger where the merger will promote
national interest.
CONCLUSION
Although the MACA and CMA contain merger control provisions from
the competition perspective, what remains unclear is the
application of the merger regimes to mergers between parties from
sectors other than the aviation services and communications and
multimedia sectors. However, regardless of the form and structure
that the incoming merger regime will take (e.g. whether reporting
will be pre- or post-merger, whether reporting will be made
voluntary or involuntary, or what thresholds and tests will be
applied), competition law will become an important consideration at
the preparatory and due diligence stages of M&A transactions
once the proposed merger control regime comes into effect.
In the event of an investigation, competition authorities will
usually request a large number of internal documents that will be
used to assess the transaction. Preparatory documents evidencing a
company's rationale for the transaction, e.g. the commercial
justification and/or pro-competition aspect of the transaction can
therefore be very important in any later competition law
assessment, in particular since such documentation may need to be
disclosed to competition authorities.
With the increasing enforcement of competition laws in Malaysia and
competition authorities worldwide uncovering more cross-border
cartels, it is also important that buyers conduct due diligence to
assess whether the target company has engaged in any competition
law infringement and address it. At a minimum, the transaction
documentation should include appropriate safeguards to ensure
apportionment of risk, such as via a specific indemnity
indicating who bears the financial risk if following completion a
competition authority uncovers a breach of competition law by the
target, and whether liabilities should be capped and subject to
past conduct only. This will avoid significant problems not only
financially but also potential reputational repercussions at a
later stage.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.