On April 2, 2025, the Trump administration declared a new "Liberation Day"—a sweeping trade policy shift marked by aggressive new tariffs that reverberate far beyond traditional bilateral trade disputes. While most headlines focused on the flat 10% tariff on all U.S. imports, the more consequential development may be the birth of a new trade enforcement mechanism: the secondary tariff.
Under Executive Order 14245, the United States now claims the authority to impose a 25% tariff on all goods from any country that imports Venezuelan oil, whether directly or through intermediaries. This is not merely a sanctions expansion. It is a geopolitical reshaping of trade policy through discretionary economic punishment for third-party relationships—a dramatic shift from prior norms of trade enforcement.
Understanding the "Secondary Tariff" Regime
EO 14245 amends and expands the authority previously set out in EO 13692, originally issued in 2015 and aimed at freezing assets and restricting entry of Venezuelan regime-affiliated individuals. Now, the Trump administration has empowered a multi-agency coalition—led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and including the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Homeland Security—to target countries not for their conduct toward the U.S., but for their trade ties with Venezuela.
This secondary tariff policy carries a presumptive 25% duty on all goods imported from such countries into the U.S. The language is discretionary, not automatic: a tariff may be imposed, but the administration has signaled a strong appetite for action. The list of impacted countries was scheduled for release on April 2 but has yet to be formally published—creating uncertainty for global supply chains and U.S. importers alike.
The Global Ripple Effect
Countries like India, China, Spain, Brazil, Turkey, Vietnam, and Italy are among the largest consumers of Venezuelan oil. Many are also among the top exporters to the U.S. Should secondary tariffs be applied, these countries would face not only heightened costs for U.S. exports but may also be forced to choose between energy relationships and access to the American market.
This creates a strategic dilemma: comply with U.S. secondary sanctions and tariffs or continue energy imports from Venezuela and risk being economically blacklisted by one of the world's largest consumer markets.
Ironically, while the U.S. seeks to penalize other countries for importing Venezuelan oil, it continues to do so itself. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the U.S. imported approximately 287,000 barrels of Venezuelan crude oil per day as of January 2025—a figure likely to decline as General Licenses issued by OFAC expire or are revoked, but nevertheless highlighting the inconsistency in enforcement.
Discretion, Ambiguity, and Enforcement Risks
Unlike traditional sanctions programs or WTO-governed tariffs, the secondary tariff framework under EO 14245 lacks clear standards, deadlines, or dispute mechanisms. It empowers the Secretary of Commerce to determine which countries are importing Venezuelan oil (directly or indirectly), and the Secretary of State to determine if a tariff should be imposed.
The Order provides for expiration of the tariff either one year after the last date of Venezuelan oil importation or at a discretionary earlier date. There is no procedural roadmap for removal or challenge—raising the risk that countries could remain on the tariff list indefinitely, even after severing ties with Venezuela.
Moreover, it is not yet clear whether these 25% tariffs will stack on top of the new 10% baseline tariff, potentially creating effective duties of 35% or more for impacted nations.
Regulatory Backdrop and the OFAC Shift
This shift marks a stark contrast from the Biden administration's 2023 attempt to normalize relations with Venezuela. In October 2023, OFAC issued General License 44, authorizing certain oil, gas, and gold transactions in exchange for democratic concessions from the Maduro regime.
But as Maduro failed to meet those commitments, OFAC replaced that license with GL44A, restricting all new business and permitting only wind-down activities. By February 2025, President Trump terminated multiple General Licenses, signaling a return to a maximum pressure strategy, including revoking active licenses and further restricting U.S. producers' Venezuelan operations.
What Companies Should Do Now
Businesses with international operations—particularly those importing from countries known to engage with Venezuela—must now factor geopolitical alignment into their supply chain risk matrix. Recommended steps include:
- Mapping upstream and downstream exposure to Venezuelan oil markets;
- Tracking official country-by-country guidance from Commerce and State Departments;
- Engaging customs and trade counsel to assess the probability and impact of secondary tariff exposure;
- Preparing for double-duty costs, especially if stacked tariffs materialize;
- Planning for abrupt license terminations and ensuring contingency contracts are in place.
Conclusion
The introduction of secondary tariffs signals a bolder, less restrained use of economic tools to advance foreign policy objectives. While the stated target is Venezuela, the real impact is global—and potentially transformative for how the United States regulates and retaliates against global commerce.
Companies and countries alike must now navigate a trade environment where guilt by association could mean a 25% penalty on every product crossing U.S. borders.
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