I. Introduction

In December 2005, the Supreme Court of Washington filed its decision on Korslund v. Dyncorp Tri-Cities. In this case, the court considered the following three issues: (1) whether forced medical leave amounts to discharge; (2) under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring a claim of wrongful discharge or retaliation in violation of public policy; and (3) whether a promise of specific treatment is enforceable.

II. Facts

In 1997, Steven Korslund, Virginia Miller and John Acosta worked for DynCorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc., and Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. ("DynCorp") at Hanford Nuclear Reservation. They made a series of reports describing safety violations, mismanagement, fraud, and retaliation. Later that same year, a Hanford psychologist placed Korslund on disability and a physician placed Miller on medical disability. Acosta remained at work, but was treated for disabilities related to stress.

Korslund, Miller, and Acosta sued Dyncorp. Korslund and Miller brought a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Acosta joined Korslund and Miller on claims of wrongful retaliation in violation of public policy and breach of a promise of specific treatment. The trial court dismissed all the claims in favor of DynCorp. Korslund, Miller, and Acosta appealed.

III. When Can Medical Leave Amount to Discharge?

The Supreme Court discussed whether a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy can be based on a theory of constructive discharge where an employee permanently leaves the job on medical leave but does not quit or resign. Without much difficulty, the court found that an employee who is forced to permanently leave the workforce for medical reasons may have been constructively discharged.

IV. Were Plaintiffs’ Claims Necessary for Effective Enforcement of Public Policy?

To succeed on a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the existence of a clear public policy protecting the plaintiffs; (2) that discouraging the conduct would jeopardize public policy; (3) the employee’s conduct caused the dismissal; and (4) the employer is not able to justify the dismissal.

Plaintiffs satisfied the first element of their claim by demonstrating that a strong public policy protected their rights as whistleblowers. However, the court found that they could not meet their burden under the second element because the Energy Reorganization Act ("ERA") adequately protected their rights to report an employer’s misconduct without retaliation or reprisal. Moreover, the ERA provides an administrative process for the adjudication of whistleblower complaints, back pay, reinstatement of the complainant to his or her former work position, compensatory damages, attorney fees and expert costs. Therefore, plaintiffs could not persuade the court that the defendants conduct jeopardized public policy and their claim failed.

The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion on the claim of wrongful retaliation in violation of public policy. It held that the public policy relied on by the plaintiffs was adequately protected by the remedies under the ERA.

V. Can a Promise of Specific Treatment Be Enforceable?

Korslund, Miller, and Acosta claimed that DynCorp breached promises of specific treatment in specific conditions. The court recognized three elements that a plaintiff must prove to bring a claim for breach of a promise of specific treatment in specific situations: (1) that the promise was written; (2) that it was relied upon; and (3) that the promise was breached.

The court focused its analysis on Korslund. Korslund had signed an employment application stating that his employment was at will. But, the court stated that it was possible that DynCorp had issued its policy manual to Korslund with promises of specific treatment in specific situations. The court recognized that promises in an employee handbook may be given effect provided that they do not conflict with a specific, enforceable contractual term. However, the court rejected the proposition that once an application containing an at-will provision is signed the employer is then free to make whatever promises it wishes without any obligation to carry them out. The court clarified that an employee must prove that he or she was aware of the specific promises allegedly breached and that those specific promises induced him or her to remain on the job and not seek other employment. The court held an employee does not need to be discharged to bring a specific treatment claim.

VI. Conclusion

Although the Supreme Court recognized that in certain circumstances forced medical leave may amount to discharge, the court concluded that there were adequate alternatives available to protect the public policy identified by the plaintiffs. As a result, the court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims involving wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and wrongful retaliation in violation of public policy. The court sent the remaining claim back to the trial court to resolve the issue of whether the employer made promises of specific treatment in specific situations. 

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