Introduction

Bill Dodwell, Head of Tax Policy Group – Deloitte

The Budget was full of lots of headline-grabbing measures – but many of them will apply to few people.

The top rate of tax will rise to 50% for the 350,000 people with income over £150,000 – from April 2010. At the same time, those with income over £100,000 will lose all personal allowances – which will cost about 700,000 people something like £220 pm. Tax deductions for pension contributions for those earning over £150,000 will be limited to basic rate – from April 2011, with some rules to stop early contributions. These measures are expected to raise £7 billion pa.

Business reliefs are modest. The £50,000 loss relief rule will be extended for a second year – allowing loss-making businesses to recover tax paid in the three previous years. However, the refund for a company is only £10,000 – so not a huge help. No further help for empty properties, though. There's an increase in Capital allowances for expenditure in the year to April 2010. However, the NPV is very small, so won't encourage extra investment.

The much heralded scrappage scheme will offer £2,000 to those who buy a new car; however, much of this money will end up financing cars manufactured overseas.

There are important new powers in relation to tax evasion and tax reporting. There will be a defaulters list, so that those who deliberately evade tax of £25,000 will be named. Finance directors will need to take personal responsibility for company tax filings.

Finally, the Foreign Profits measures will come in this year. The dividend exemption will apply from 1 July 2009 but the tax-raising interest restrictions will apply only from accounting periods starting on or after 1 January 2010 – a welcome delay.

The Tip of the Iceberg

Roger Bootle, Economic Adviser to Deloitte

As expected, the budget was a holding operation which left the real decisions to be enacted by whoever is Chancellor after the election.

The startling thing, though, is that, huge though the borrowing figures are, they are still likely to prove to be too low.

The borrowing projections are based upon a recovery in the economy next year of 1.25%, and a supercharged recovery, running at no less than 3.5% per annum, thereafter. By contrast, I suspect that there will be a further decline in GDP next year and only a moderate recovery when it comes.

The main difference in the forecast comes from a different view of stockbuilding, which is notoriously difficult to predict, and of consumers' expenditure. The Treasury believes that next year it will be rising by 0.25%. By contrast, with high and rising unemployment, falling house prices and average earnings growth at minimal levels, and consumers wanting to rebuild their financial strength, I suspect that consumer spending will fall by 1.5%.

Because of my greater pessimism about economic growth, I am pencilling in peak borrowing of about £230 billion, or 16% of GDP, next year, compared with £175 billion forecast by the Chancellor.

The poor state of the public finances has restricted it to a further stimulus of only 0.5% of GDP, a pathetic figure in view of the seriousness of the recession.But neither has the Chancellor done a great deal in the direction of restoring orthodox finances by reducing the borrowing requirement. He has been inhibited by both the concern not to make the recession worse by drawing demand out of the economy now, and by his reluctance, for political reasons, to announce either large tax rises or big cuts in spending.

The planned growth of public spending has been pared back, but even after these supposedly draconic reductions, as a percentage of GDP debt will not peak until 2015/16. It looks as though it could be thirty or forty years hence before the debt to GDP ratio is back below 40%. In these circumstances the announced squeeze on public spending doesn't go anywhere near far enough. There will be worse news to come from whoever is Chancellor next year and beyond

Taxation of Foreign Profits Reform – Enhancing UK Competitiveness?

Joanne Pleasant, Tax Director – Deloitte

Today's Budget announcement that the Government will introduce the foreign profits reform package in Finance Bill 2009 is the latest development in more than two years of discussion and consultation on this topic. The Government's stated aim of this reform is to enhance and support the competitiveness of the UK tax system. The key question is does the reform package announced meet this aim?

The Government has described the package of foreign profits reform as 'balanced and affordable' so it is clear this is not intended to represent a tax saving. Therefore, in order for the package to enhance UK competitiveness, reform should offer compliance savings. It is, however, not clear this will be achieved under the current package.

Dividend Exemption

Today's announcement states that an exemption from corporation tax will apply to qualifying dividends received on or after 1 July 2009. The original proposals suggested exemption would only apply to medium and large enterprises but has now been extended to all companies. This is a positive development in terms of UK competitiveness. Many multinational businesses are expected to benefit from the introduction of exemption, even though for many this will not result in lower actual cash taxes, but will reduce their compliance burden, and extending exemption to include small businesses (who were not offered exemption in the original announcement at the November Pre-Budget report) is a welcome development. However, recent EU case law already supports the position that dividends from EU subsidiaries are not currently taxable in the UK anyway and it must be remembered that the corollary of the fact that many foreign dividends will become tax exempt in corporate hands is that the current blanket exemption for UK-UK dividends is being removed.

Most domestic dividends should still remain exempt under one of the available exempt classes and today's press notice states that 'the vast majority of distributions are expected to be exempt'. However, extra thought will have to be given to UK-UK dividend flows in the future to be certain of the exemption and some technical difficulties with the earlier draft legislation might leave those receiving dividends from UK or foreign associates (between 10% and 50%) relying on a motive clearance from HMRC. For these provisions to truly reduce compliance obligations detailed guidance should be published which sets out when the motive test is not satisfied.

Adding dividend exemption to the existing UK exemption from tax on disposals of qualifying shareholdings (the substantial shareholding exemption) and the UK's lack of domestic withholding tax on dividend payments are all positive indicators of the competitiveness of the UK tax system, especially in relation to attracting foreign investment. However, there are some negative elements to this equation.

Interest Restriction – the Worldwide Debt Cap

One of the most competitive features of the UK tax system in the past has been the lack of any general limitations on the tax deductibility of interest. The UK does have rules to limit interest deductions in certain circumstances including transfer pricing/thin capitalisation and the anti-arbitrage rules but has not previously had a general rule to restrict deductions for corporate interest in the UK. The announcement today that the worldwide debt cap will apply to interest deductions of large groups for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2010 changes this landscape.

The proposals for the debt cap as amended by the update published by HMRC on 7 April 2009 for the change to the proposed mechanics are an improvement on the complex and wide-ranging proposals originally published for consultation by HMRC in December 2008. For example, the revised mechanics for calculating the 'available amount' based on the gross consolidated interest costs of the group (rather than net of interest income as had previously been proposed) will assist those groups who have external debt but also have surplus cash in their business.

Basing the calculation of the 'tested amount' on each entity rather than analysing each individual loan relationship should also simplify the test. These are welcome developments. Unfortunately the provisions remain very complex and represent a major compliance burden for groups even if they will have no ultimate disallowance of interest. In addition the positive steps forward in design are accompanied by proposals for a targeted anti-avoidance rule (TAAR) which will aim to prevent back to back arrangements to manipulate the available or tested amounts. The drafting of the TAAR will clearly be crucial and it is likely that this will introduce uncertainty into the calculation.

The policy design of the debt cap is to target situations where the UK has more debt borrowed from other group members than the worldwide consolidated group has borrowed from third parties. This policy will penalise those groups with debt in the UK borrowed from other group members who do not have significant levels of debt borrowed from third parties at a consolidated level and so are managing their group balance sheet in a conservative manner. Such groups will be at a disadvantage if bidding for a UK project against another investor who has a debtladen balance sheet. How can this be the right answer – so long as the debt is arm's length in both cases then where is the avoidance mischief which HMRC is so keen to correct? It is important to note that no other territory has attempted to introduce an interest restriction with a similar policy design. The introduction of the debt cap cannot be regarded as a move which will enhance and support UK competitiveness and this aspect of the policy design of the debt cap seems more likely to damage the UK's competitive position than to enhance it.

The original foreign profits package announced at the November Pre-Budget Report included proposals to extend the current anti-avoidance 'unallowable purpose' rule which applies to interest and derivative contracts. Today's announcement has dropped this element of the package, which is a welcome development given the very wide drafting proposed in the December draft legislation, but states this area will be kept under review.

Controlled Foreign Companies

The other potentially negative element when measuring the competitiveness of the UK tax system is the current CFC regime. In the 2008 Pre-Budget Report, the Government announced reform in this area will be the subject of separate consultation running to its own timetable. However, it is not expected that legislation for reform in this area will be introduced before 2011, leaving two years of potential uncertainty over the direction this reform will take.

The Government has said it wants a reformed CFC system to protect against diversion of UK profit and not tax profits genuinely arising overseas, but nobody knows yet what they mean by this. This uncertainty is increased by the question as to whether elements of the current UK tax system, especially the CFC rules, are compliant with the UK's obligations under the EC treaties. In the meantime, the removal of some of the existing CFC exemptions may be regarded as tightening the UK tax net in the intervening period.

Take the example of a UK group which has significant levels of profits earned and located offshore. The introduction of dividend exemption may seem like the ideal opportunity to return those profits back to the UK tax free. However, if there is a possibility under a reformed CFC system for transactions between foreign entities which do not represent diversion of UK profit being regarded as exempt, will repatriated profits be tainted, so that this sort of CFC exemption will not be available in the future if these funds are needed to invest offshore?

This sort of uncertainty is very damaging for groups and makes it difficult for them to appraise the tax impact of investment decisions and to forecast what their effective tax rates and tax capacity may be going forward. Certainty and stability in the tax system is one of the goals of this Government but the possible two year delay UK groups will face over the future of CFC reform does not sit well with that objective. This leads to the question of whether more UK headed groups will choose to relocate elsewhere in the meantime, rather than wait to see what future reform may bring.

One possible solution to this problem could be for the Government to introduce an exemption into the current CFC system for transactions between foreign entities where these do not represent diversion of UK profit. This could be an interim measure to alleviate the pressure on the current CFC rules and to counteract some of the attractions which inversion offers to some UK headed groups. Even confining such an exemption to allowing financing between offshore entities outside the CFC net where this does not represent erosion of the UK tax base would be a welcome development, and would signal the Government's commitment to enhancing the competitiveness of this area of UK taxation.

The Government does have a real opportunity now to demonstrate it is committed to supporting and enhancing the competitiveness of the UK's tax system and to build on the positive step forward which dividend exemption represents. A good example of this is the statement made today that the Government will work with business representatives to consider evidence for changes to the way the tax system encourages the location of innovative activity in the UK. Introducing an incentive based regime to attract IP ownership into the UK could be a really positive development for UK competitiveness. The key to enhancing the UK's competitive position will be what happens with CFC reform and we would urge the Government to do whatever it can to allay the uncertainty over this area in the short term.

Worldwide Debt Cap: Are we nearly there yet?

Ben Moseley, Treasury Tax Director – Deloitte

The most controversial, or at least the most talked about, part of HM Treasury/HMRC's foreign profits reform package, to be introduced in Finance Bill 2009 as announced in today's Budget, is undoubtedly the proposal to restrict tax relief for finance costs incurred by UK members of a group, to that group's aggregate external finance costs.

This article does not seek to examine the merits and demerits of the "debt cap" as a concept, or its place within the foreign profits package, nor does it summarise in detail the debt cap rules themselves; rather, the below analyses the position we have reached on the debt cap and, critically, what this means for businesses in a variety of key areas.

Background to the Debt Cap

HMRC's original draft rules on the debt cap were released on 9 December 2008. It is widely acknowledged that the cap targeted two main circumstances:

  1. Non-UK parented groups, which leveraged their UK sub-group with a greater (absolute) level of debt than the group's aggregate borrowings; and
  2. UK parented groups, with significant borrowings in the UK from overseas subsidiaries resulting in net UK tax deductions (the theory being, such upstream loans will be unnecessary once the UK has a dividend exemption).

The rules were subject to a consultation period up to 3 March 2009 and HMRC received over 200 responses, no doubt focussing on key overall policy areas (such as whether a restriction on interest deductibility is required given existing anti-avoidance and, if so, is the debt cap the correct approach), the compliance burden resulting for groups who were not in the above two target areas, and more specific problem areas (some of which are explored below).

Who could the Debt Cap apply to?

The cap would apply to "large" groups – broadly meaning independent groups which have at least 250 employees, and an annual turnover of over €50m and/or net assets exceeding €43m.

Within such a "large" group, the companies affected by the debt cap would be the "relevant group companies" – UK tax resident companies which are either the ultimate corporate parent (the top body corporate in the "group" as defined for accounting purposes) or are 75% subsidiaries of this ultimate corporate parent.

Although the cap is part of the foreign profits package, it is important to note that it is not purely international groups who would be affected; wholly UK groups fall within the scope.

Basic Framework

In absolute overview, the operation of the original debt cap rules involved a comparison of:

  • The "tested amount", being the aggregate intragroup finance expense of all relevant group companies; to
  • The "available amount", being the external finance cost of the consolidated group as shown in the consolidated IAS accounts, less UK external finance costs shown in the accounts of UK subsidiaries, less the worldwide finance income again from the consolidated IAS accounts.

If the tested amount exceeds the available amount, there is a disallowance, which can be allocated across relevant group companies as the group sees fit. However, there is also an adjustment mechanism, to strike out intragroup financing income in relevant group companies, to the extent that there is a disallowed amount.

The above does not begin to do justice to the complexity of the drafting, which inevitably resulted in a number of potential inefficiencies and, crucially, a significant compliance burden due to the wide scope as mentioned above.

Update from HMRC

Following the consultation, HMRC released a note on 7 April 2009 setting out proposed changes to the debt cap rules. No updated draft legislation was released at the time, and none has been released in the Budget today – the next set of draft legislation is expected to be contained in the Finance Bill 2009, likely to be available at the end of April or early May. What has been confirmed in the Budget today, is that the debt cap will take effect for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2010. (As an aside, HMRC has announced that the proposed extension to the "unallowable purpose" rules, another potential restriction on finance cost deductibility, will not be included in Finance Bill 2009).

The changes set out in HMRC's note included the following:

The definition of "ultimate corporate parent" will be revised, to cater for non-corporate parents, dual-listed structures etc. and to exclude (where appropriate) collective investment schemes.

  • The calculation of the "tested amount" will be substantially changed:

    a) the calculation will be on entity basis, being each relevant group company's net financing expense – i.e. finance cost less finance income, intragroup and external;

    b) foreign exchange gains and losses will be excluded;

    c) short term debt will be excluded – broadly being debt with a fixed repayment date of less than 12 months and on-demand facilities, but with measures to include amounts effectively re-borrowed;

    d) amounts below a to-be-determined de minimis will be excluded; and

    e) there will be a mechanism to elect to exclude certain loan balances if these would give rise to stranded tax losses, in certain circumstances.
  • The definition of the available amount will also be changed, to the worldwide consolidated group's gross finance expense – i.e. including UK and non-UK but excluding financing income.
  • The basic disallowance mechanism, if the tested amount exceeds the available amount, will remain largely as before; and there will still be an adjustment mechanism to reduce companies' net finance income (external and intra-group) if there is a disallowance.
  • There will be one simple "gateway" test, whereby if the aggregate of the net debt in relevant group companies does not exceed a percentage (expected to be 75%) of the consolidated group's total gross debt, the debt cap rules will not apply to the group.
  • In addition, it will be possible to make a statement that the group is satisfied that the tested amount does not exceed the available amount and therefore the debt cap rules do not need to be applied – the group will need to be able to demonstrate this.
  • Finally, there will be a targeted anti-avoidance rule, to prevent groups taking measures to either reduce the "tested amount", increase the "available amount", or meet the gateway test.
  • There are also significant changes for financial services groups, but these are not covered in this article.

The above is, of course, all very interesting but the key question is:

What does this all mean?

The proposed changes are likely to mean that the debt cap impacts UK and non-UK parented groups in very different ways. This is considered below, along with a selection of the key specific issues raised in respect of the original rules:

Non-UK parented groups

As stated above, one of the aims of the debt cap is to prevent overseas-parented groups from leveraging UK sub-groups, with debt in excess of the total debt of the consolidated group.

HMRC see this as generous, compared to regimes in other jurisdictions which, for example, limit interest deductibility based on an allocation of the total debt of the consolidated group to the local sub-group. However the original definition of the "available amount" as a net figure (i.e. costs less income) would have disadvantaged groups with both external debt and cash.

The revised proposed definition of the "available amount", as the group's gross finance costs, should improve the position. Likewise, the proposed gateway test is expected to mainly apply to inbound groups, such that if this is passed, the detailed debt cap measures do not need to be considered and the compliance burden for such groups should drop away. However, there will still inevitably be non-UK parented groups who feel that the debt cap applying on top of existing anti-avoidance (in particular transfer pricing rules, which should limit UK finance deductions to an arm's length level of debt for the sub-group) is unnecessary, particularly as these groups are in many cases unlikely to benefit from the positive aspects of foreign profits reform (i.e. the dividend exemption).

Therefore we are likely to see further debate and consultation on this, depending (as ever) on the detail of the revised draft rules.

UK parented groups

One of the main themes of the consultation process was the compliance burden that the debt cap would impose on groups not necessarily within the target of the debt cap – particularly, wholly UK groups (whose net intra-group deductible finance costs will tend to be £nil) and UK parented groups without significant upstream loans.

The revised rules may offer some limited relief from this compliance burden; for example wholly UK groups which borrow externally into a group treasury company, and then lend on to ultimate traders, should be able to take advantage of the voluntary declaration mentioned above, that the tested amount does not exceed the available amount.

For large groups, however, the position will rarely be so simple. Groups with complex intra-group financing positions will find themselves needing to still go through the complexity of the debt cap calculations, either to work out their disallowances and income adjustments as before, or to satisfy themselves that the declaration can be made.

The absence of a gateway test along the lines of that previously proposed by HMRC, to compare deductible intragroup financing expense to taxable intra-group financing income, is likely to disappoint UK-parented groups.

Therefore again, HMRC's proposals are unlikely to be the end of the debate for UK headed groups; both on the detail and on the over-riding policy – i.e. given that the UK already has CFC rules (which are of course to be reformed) and there will be targeted anti-avoidance within the dividend exemption to prevent the artificial location of, inter alia, finance income in low-tax paying jurisdictions, is the debt cap really required?

Treasury Companies and Cash Pooling

HMRC's proposed changes should reduce the complexity of the debt cap rules for group treasury companies, and hopefully for companies containing the group treasury function, in relatively simple circumstances. If a treasury company borrows (externally and intra-group) and lends on at a margin, the company will not typically have a net finance expense and therefore will not be within the scope of the debt cap.

This could remove one potential problem of the original rules, which in some circumstances could have penalised groups for locating treasury functions in the UK rather than overseas.

This net measure of the tested amount and the proposed exclusion of short term debt could also simplify the effect of the rules on cash pooling activities, although as always the precise wording of the revised legislation will be critical here.

Foreign exchange hedging

The removal of foreign exchange differences from the tested and available amounts should remove the unintended effects of the debt cap rules on simple FX hedging strategies. However, the application of the cap where consolidated groups and individual UK companies account in different currencies appears uncertain.

Stranded losses

The proposal to enable companies to exclude certain loan balances from the debt cap rules where stranded losses would otherwise result, is positive but could create further complexity. HMRC's proposals also only appear to deal with the situation where brought forward losses exist already, and not where the debt cap could effectively move deductions from a trading company (where deductions, if not used in the current year, will tend to be more flexible) to a holding/financing company.

Also, this measure would not help foreign parented groups who suffer an increase in overseas taxes (through CFC equivalents or reduced foreign tax credits), where net taxable income moves from one UK subsidiary to another.

Compliance burden

The gateway test may remove the compliance burden for a number of inbound groups, and the ability to make a declaration that the rules will not apply, along with the net measure of the "tested amount", will also simplify matters for some groups. However on the whole, the debt cap is still likely to result in group tax functions needing to prepare potentially complex calculations to either apply the cap or to properly make the declaration – including for groups that do not fall within the basic target area of the cap.

So, are we nearly there yet?

HMRC's proposed changes would appear to substantially improve several areas of the debt cap rules and therefore represent a step in the right direction. However, the devil is likely to be in the detail and therefore, before the revised rules are published in the Finance Bill, it is difficult to say how close we are to a workable set of provisions.

What is clear is that there will be further debate on a number of points of detail (not least the compliance burden, which does not seem to have been eased for, e.g., wholly UK groups with complex intra-group positions), not to mention the big picture policy behind the cap. Therefore we may be on the right track, but it's likely that there is a long way still to go before groups can plan for the debt cap with any certainty.

The Entrepreneurs' Budget: Not now, Darling

Tony Cohen, Tax Partner – Deloitte

In his opening speech, Mr Darling declared his budget as one built of core values of 'fairness' and 'opportunity'. The result of the measures announced, according to the Chancellor, would enable Britain to grow its way out of recession. So will the Budget provide entrepreneurs with the opportunity to achieve growth. And is it fair?

Undoubtedly the headline from an entrepreneurs' perspective was the 10% increase in the income tax rate on earnings of £150,000 or more from 40% to 50% (and yes, this is a 10% increase: the 45% rate announced in November's Pre-Budget Rate was just that: announced, but never implemented). Psychologically the 50% rate is always considered a bit of barrier as only half of every £1 earned is actually kept and indeed the scale is tipped distinctly in HMRC's favour when the impact of the increase national insurance contributions are taken into account. It's a big leap to say that of itself it will deter entrepreneurs from generating income over £150,000 but it will definitely lead to consideration of how the value created is realised. The obvious answer to this from a tax perspective is to plan to ensure that value is realised as a capital gain, the rate of which remained unchanged at 18%. The traditional exit route for gains is limited as very few deals are being done in the current environment. So the message from the Budget must be: invest now to grow for the future and limit the amount taken out.

As to whether the Budget was a 'fair' one there are a few ways of looking at this. From a fiscal perspective it was a mixture of pluses and minuses. On the 'plus' side measures were announced which would clearly support entrepreneurs and small businesses:

  • 40% first year allowance for capital expenditure incurred in between April 2009 and April 2010;
  • extension of the loss carry-back from 1 year to 3 years;
  • practical support via the top-up credit insurance and deferral of tax liabilities; and
  • deferral of the 1% increase in the small companies tax rate.

Whilst the sentiment is welcome, the impact in cash terms may be limited. The maximum benefit of the additional loss carryback is £14,000 and the value of the 1% deferral over the first £300,000 is £3,000 – neither of which are sums likely to change entrepreneurial behaviour. The increase in capital allowances may have a much bigger financial impact, and could indeed accelerate some investment decisions, but it is a temporary increase for one year only.

On the 'minus' side there are increased costs. The increase in the income tax and national insurance rates as well as the 2p rise in fuel duty is pretty indiscriminate and affects most companies in most sectors, entrepreneurs and small businesses included. From a numbers point of view, then, whether the Budget is fair is arguable. One thing is clear it is not a big Budget give-away.

Another way of looking at whether the Budget is 'fair' is in dealing with the relationship between HMRC and the taxpayer or 'customers' as we are increasingly known. On the one hand HMRC are publicly encouraging open and honest relationships with its taxpaying customers, as evidenced by the increasing role of the Customer Relationship Managers in the forefront of HMRC dealings. It was always accepted that taxpayers could run their businesses to minimise tax yet the increasing interchangeability of avoidance and evasion (one legal, one not) and today's announcement of a 'name and shame' policy for deliberate tax defaulters suggests that taxpayers and HMRC may now not see eye-to-eye. On the face of it naming taxpayers who deliberately default HMRC may not be contentious. The difficulty comes in the definition of 'deliberate' which is applied and which all turns on whether the HMRC believe a taxpayer has taken reasonable care. Where reasonable care has not been taken, the implication is that the default is deliberate. This could apply to 'grey' areas of legislation, even where the taxpayer has taken professional advice and the limit for such naming and shaming is set very low at £25k. This inevitably provokes the question of whether HMRC deliberately intend to use 'naming and shaming' as part of the approach for dealing with difficult tax issues?

The overall message coming out of the Budget for entrepreneurs concentrate on growing the business and plan how to realise the value generated carefully.

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