The Superior Court has decided that attorneys do not have a monopoly over the representation of a person or company before the Administrative Tribunal of Quebec, Immovable Property Division (ATQ), in respect of the contestation of property taxes (Ville de Longueuil c. Cour du Québec et al. (2018) QCCS 5546 .

The Honourable Thomas M. Davis, J.S.C., handed down an important decision in the wake of the Supreme Court ruling in Barreau du Québec v. Attorney General of Quebec 2017 SCC 56.

The judge rejected an application for judicial review of the decision of the Court of Quebec which had ruled on decisions of the ATQ which, in certain cases, had granted motions for dismissal of contested property tax bills on the grounds that the applicant was not represented by an attorney whereas, in other cases, the ATQ had rejected similar applications. The Court of Quebec had confirmed the right of a company to act and be represented before the ATQ by a mandatary who was not an attorney.

The ATQ had allowed a company, Russel Metals Inc., (represented by an executive appointed for that purpose) to act before the ATQ to prepare the proceedings initiating the contestation of the assessment, attend before the court and make representations. The recourse related to the contestation of property assessments made by various municipalities, including Longueuil, Laval and Sherbrooke.

The cities, with the support of the Barreau du Québec, invoked Sections 128 and 129 of the Act respecting the Barreau du Québec (ABQ) to claim that such representation of a company fell under the monopoly of the attorney.

After having determined that the standard of review of the decision of the ATQ is that of correctness (opposed to reasonableness), since it relates to the interpretation of the ABQ and not a matter within the expertise of the ATQ or its enabling legislation, Mr. Justice Davis determined that Sections 128 and 129 of the ABQ, read together, taking into account the intent of the legislator and spirit of the ABQ, aim to encourage the exercise of rights before the administrative courts discharging quasi-judicial functions, particularly since such representation is only a reality before the administrative tribunals.

According to the court, it is not appropriate to make a reductionist distinction between acting and being represented by someone who is not an attorney. Being represented before the ATQ includes representation in person, such as pleading, as well as representations in writing, such as preparing pleadings. In the ABQ, representing a person is broader than acting on behalf of that person and these are not acts that the ABQ wishes to reserve for attorneys. Therefore, according to the judgment, a person who is not an attorney can prepare the appeal of the assessment, file it on behalf of a corporation and represent that person before a quasi-judicial body, such as the ATQ.

In addition, the company could appoint its controller (who is not an officer or a director of the company) to prepare the appeal form before the ATQ and represent the company. The controller was mandated by the company which gave him sufficient status, according to the court.

This judgement therefore supports a clear trend by the judiciary to give effect to and encourage achieving the intent expressed by the legislator in the ABQ and in certain administrative and quasi-judicial legislation, namely that access to justice is an important right and allowing citizens and legal entities to act before these non-judicial bodies without being represented by an attorney is a societal value that must be recognized, accepted and encouraged.

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