Good afternoon,
Following are the summaries of civil decisions released this week by the Court of Appeal for Ontario. It was a relatively light week, typical of the summer months.
The highlight was a Small Claims Court decision. In Riddell v. Apple Canada Inc., the Court confirmed that Deputy Judges of the Small Claims Court have jurisdiction to order one side to submit to the pre-trial inspection of property by the other side. The claim related to alleged burns suffered by the plaintiff as a result of an overheated iPhone. He had refused to allow Apple to inspect the phone before trial.
In A.M. v. Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell, a Crown wardship decision, the Court of Appeal overturned the Divisional Court and restored a motion judge's decision to add a child's foster mother as a party to the adoption proceeding, affirming that the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration and that other considerations, such as delay and legal interests, while relevant, are not, by themselves, determinative.
Other topics covered this week included a family shareholder/real property dispute, pension benefits, wrongful dismissal and a contractual interpretation case relating to what appears to have been a tax-driven transaction that did not yield the tax consequences that had been expected.
Have a nice weekend.
Table of Contents
A.M. v. Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell, 2017 ONCA 601
Keywords
: Family Law, Crown Wardship, Adoption, Standing, Addition of Parties, Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, ss 39(1), (3), Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r 7(4), (5)
1162740 Ontario Limited v. Pingue, 2017 ONCA 583
Keywords: Corporations, Shareholder Remedies, Evidence, Experts, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 53.08, Offers to Settle, Substantial Indemnity Costs
Riddell v. Apple Canada Inc., 2017 ONCA 590
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Courts, Small Claims Court, Jurisdiction, Pre-Trial Discovery, Inspection of Property, Courts of Justice Act, s. 25, Rules of the Small Claims Court, O. Reg. 258/98, r. 1.03(2), 17.03(2), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 32.01
Bell v. Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2017 ONCA 587
Keywords: Pension and Benefits Law, Survivor Pension Benefits, Conjugal Relationship, Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8
Brompton Corp. v. Tuckamore Holdings LP, 2017 ONCA 594
Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Representations and Warranties, Factual Matrix, Deference, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 SCR 633
Aboagye v. Atomic Energy of Canada, 2017 ONCA 598
Keywords: Employment Law, Wrongful Dismissal, Cause, Dishonesty, National Security, Summary Judgment
For Civil Endorsements, click here.
For Criminal and Ontario Review Board Decisions, click here.
Civil Decisions:
A.M. v. Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell, 2017 ONCA 601
[Hoy A.C.J.O, van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.]
Counsel:
J. Bergeron, for the appellant
A. Pare-Chouinard, for the respondents
Keywords: Family Law, Crown Wardship, Adoption, Standing, Addition of Parties, Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, ss 39(1), (3), Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r 7(4), (5)
Facts:
The child, A.M., was made a ward of Valoris pour enfants et adultes de Prescott-Russell (the "Society") at the age of two months. In December 2015, when he was seven months old, he was placed with a foster-to-adopt mother (the "F-A mother").
The Society filed a status review application in January of 2016 requesting the child be made a Crown ward with no access rights to the parents. The Society's position was that if the child was made a Crown ward, it would support the F-A mother as the adoptive parent for the child. An uncontested trial of the Society's application for Crown wardship was scheduled and adjourned pending the opportunity for the biological parents to move to set aside their noting in default. No such motion was brought. A paternal aunt and her partner expressed an intention to adopt the child early in 2016. In June of 2016 the Society decided to support that plan instead. The paternal aunt and her partner filed a motion seeking to be added as parties and for a temporary order for care of the child. That motion was adjourned. The F-A mother brought a motion seeking to be added as a party to the child protection proceeding.
The motion judge considered the facts of the case and found that the F-A mother was in the best position to inform the Court as to what the specific needs are and what is in the best interest of the child. He ordered that the F-A mother be a party to the proceeding or, if a higher court disagreed with that determination, that the F-A mother have full rights to participate in this proceeding pursuant to s. 39(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11 ("CFSA"). He found that s.39(1) of the CFSA provides who will be automatically be parties to a child protection proceeding, but does not limit parties to those listed. He also noted that s.39(3) of the CFSA provides a limited right of participation for non-parties, such as foster parents, to the proceeding, and found that this was not an indication that a foster parent should not be made a party.
On appeal, the Divisional Court found that the motion judge overlooked the existing presumptive rights of participation of the F-A mother under the CFSA and the fact that she could request permission from the court to have her participatory rights expanded. The Divisional Court noted that the motion judge did not consider rules 7(4) and 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, which describe the parties who should be added in a child protection case and stated that the court's discretion to add parties under r. 7(5) should be exercised with caution.
The Divisional Court held that in determining whether a foster parent should be added as a party, the court should consider the following criteria:
(1) Is adding the party necessary for a determination of the issues in the case?
(2) Would adding the party cause delays in the process?
(3) Does the individual have a legal interest in the child protection proceeding?
It concluded that the motion judge failed to consider all these criteria such that the Divisional Court was entitled to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion. Furthermore, it found that adding the F-A mother would add delay and that the F-A mother did not have a legal interest in the proceeding.
Issues:
(1) Did the Divisional Court err in overturning the motion judge's decision to add the F-A mother as a party to the child protection proceeding?
Holding: Appeal allowed.
Reasoning:
(1) Yes. There was no palpable and overriding error, error in law, or unreasonable exercise in discretion to justify interfering with the motion judge's decision. The Court of Appeal found that r. 7(4) and s. 39(3) of the CFSA preserve the court's discretion to add a foster parent as a party to a child protection proceeding. The Divisional Court circumscribed the exercise of that discretion too narrowly because delay and legal interest are relevant, but not, by themselves, determinative. The overarching consideration is the child's best interests. The Court of Appeal found that the following factors, cited in Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex v H.(S.), [2002] O.J. No. 4491 were relevant:
(i) Whether the addition of the party is in the best interest of the child;
(ii) Whether the addition of the party will delay or prolong the proceedings unduly;
(iii) Whether the addition of the party is necessary to determine the issues; and
(iv) Whether the proposed party is a person capable of putting forward a plan that is in the child's best interests.
The Court of Appeal found that whether the person trying to be added also has a legal interest was also a relevant consideration based on Children's Aid Society of Algoma v. V.C., 2001 ONCJ 83, and that not all of these considerations had to go in favour of the F-A mother for her to be added. The Court of Appeal also endorsed a list of additional considerations discussed in Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v S.(R.D.) (2008), 55 RFL (6th) 132.
The Court of Appeal found that adding the F-A mother would not lead to considerable delay and that the F-A mother did have a legal interest because any opportunity for her to the adopt the child could be foreclosed based on the determination of the matter. The motion judge undertook a fact-specific and contextual analysis, and was therefore entitled to determine that the F-A mother's participation as a party was both necessary and in the child's best interests based on the facts of this case.
1162740 Ontario Limited v. Pingue, 2017 ONCA 583
[Hoy A.C.J.O., van Rensburg and Roberts JJ.A.]
Counsel:
R. Wozniak, E. Sherkin, and K. Sherkin, for the appellants
H.S. Nesathurai and G. M. Perinot, for the respondents
Keywords: Corporations, Shareholder Remedies, Evidence, Experts, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 53.08, Offers to Settle, Substantial Indemnity Costs
Facts:
These proceedings arose out of a failed business venture among two brothers – Venanzio Pingue ("Venanzio") and the respondent, Sabatino Pingue Jr. ("Sabatino"), and their cousin, Joseph Pingue ("Joseph"), involving the purchase of an apartment building at 315 Glendale Avenue in St. Catharines. The appellants appealed from the judgment of the trial judge granting a constructive trust over their properties, declaring that the appellant, Venanzio, was not a shareholder of the respondent, 1162740 Ontario Limited ("116"), and removing him as an officer and director of 116 in light of her finding that he breached his fiduciary duties.
Although it was ostensibly set up as a bare trustee, the parties treated 116 as the absolute owner of 315 Glendale Avenue. Joseph advanced the monies to purchase 315 Glendale Avenue. In consideration of his providing these funds, Sabatino and Venanzio transferred their respective shares in 116 to Joseph. Venanzio and Sabatino had a period of five years to reacquire their shares by repaying Joseph their respective portions of the monies. Venanzio never paid Joseph for his shares. The relationship foundered when Joseph and Sabatino discovered that Venanzio had misappropriated $592,671.43 from 116.
The trial judge granted judgment for the respondents and imposed a constructive trust over three properties owned by the appellants to secure repayment of the misappropriated funds. She declared that Venanzio was not a shareholder of 116 because he had not paid for his shares, and removed him as an officer and director of 116 because of his breach of his fiduciary duties to 116.
The appellants sought to admit as fresh evidence, a copy of the parcel register that shows that 315 Glendale was sold by 116 on January 25, 2017, for $7,200,000. Additionally, the appellants sought leave to appeal the trial judge's order as to costs.
Issues:
(1) Did the trial judge err in her interpretation of the parties' agreement?
(2) Did the trial judge err in refusing to admit the appellants' expert report?
(3) Should the appellants' fresh evidence be admitted?
(4) Should the appellants' leave to appeal the costs order be granted?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) No. In their amended statement of claim, their evidence and their written submissions at trial, the respondents clearly maintained that the parties had never treated 116 as a bare trustee, but always as absolute owner of 315 Glendale Avenue, and that Venanzio had transferred his shares to Joseph but never paid for them in order to be entitled to the return of the shares.
The trial judge interpreted the parties' written agreements and found them to be confusing and incomplete. This was a finding that was open to her on the record. As she was entitled to do, the trial judge accepted the respondents' evidence as to the parties' agreement concerning their relationship and the structure of their business venture. The Court of Appeal saw no basis to interfere with her conclusions.
(2) No. Granting of leave under r. 53.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to file expert reports is mandatory unless the court determines that granting leave will cause prejudice to the other party or undue delay in the conduct of the trial: Pavao v. Pinarreta, [1995] O.J. No. 1197, 40 C.P.C. (3d) 84 (C.A.), at para. 11.
The trial judge carefully and thoroughly considered and balanced all relevant factors. She determined, correctly, that the admission of the expert's report at the end of the already lengthy second trial, following the conclusion of all of the evidence, would result in non-compensable prejudice to the respondents and undue delay.
(3) No. This evidence was not necessary or relevant to any issue on this appeal.
(4) No. An appellate court is not entitled to interfere with a trial judge's discretionary assessment of costs absent error of law or overriding and palpable error. The trial judge awarded substantial indemnity costs because she found that the judgment obtained by the respondents was more favourable than their three offers to settle. She further found that Venanzio had misappropriated thousands of dollars, breached his fiduciary obligations, and attempted to deceive the court. These findings justified the award at a substantial indemnity rate.
Accordingly, the appeal from the judgment, the motion to admit fresh evidence, and the motion for leave to appeal the costs order were dismissed.
Riddell v. Apple Canada Inc., 2017 ONCA 590
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
M. Riddell, in person
M.J. Jilesen and L.D. Hogg, for the respondent
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Courts, Small Claims Court, Jurisdiction, Pre-Trial Discovery, Inspection of Property, Courts of Justice Act, s. 25, Rules of the Small Claims Court, O. Reg. 258/98, r. 1.03(2), 17.03(2), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 32.01
Facts:
In this products liability case brought in Small Claims Court, the appellant sought damages for what he alleged were personal injuries caused by the negligent manufacture of an iPhone by the respondent. He claimed that the iPhone overheated and caused severe burns to his right arm. He declared his intention to lead expert evidence at trial regarding the iPhone and the overheating event in order to establish his case. Yet, he refused, absent a court order, to permit an independent third party expert to inspect the iPhone prior to trial, to assist the trial judge in determining the central matter in dispute between the parties. The Deputy Judge ordered pre-trial inspection of the iPhone.
Issues:
(1) Do Deputy Judges of the Small Claims Court have jurisdiction to order the pre-trial inspection of property in a proper case?
(2) If such jurisdiction exists, was that jurisdiction properly exercised in the circumstances of this case?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) Yes. Where trial fairness and the interests of justice, including the expeditious and least expensive determination of a case on the merits, so require, Deputy Court Judges of the Small Claims Court have jurisdiction under r. 1.03(2) of the Rules of the Small Claims Court, O. Reg. 258/98 (Small Claims Court Rules) to order the pre-trial inspection of property by reference to r. 32.01 of the regular Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.
The Small Claims Court Rules provide, under r. 17.03, for the inspection of property by a trial judge of the Small Claims Court, in certain circumstances. They do not adequately address the pre-trial inspection of property at the instance of a litigant. However, the failure to provide for such pre-trial inspection rights may be viewed as a deficiency in the scope and operation of r. 17.03. In an exceptional case, therefore, resort may be had to r. 1.03(2) to cure this deficiency.
(2) Yes. The Court of Appeal did not accept the appellant's submission that the recognition of the authority of Deputy Court Judges of the Small Claims Court to order the pre-trial inspection of property in exceptional circumstances undermines the mandate of the Small Claims Court to hear and determine cases in a summary way. To the contrary, it would assist Deputy Judges of the Small Claims Court to fulfil this important function in accordance with s. 25 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 43. In this regard, the Court of Appeal endorsed the comments of Deputy Judge S.M. McGill of the Small Claims Court in National Service Dog Training Centre Inc. v. Hall, [2013] O.J. No. 3216, at paras. 30-31:
A question about the condition of the property cannot be determined on the merits if only one side is allowed to collect relevant evidence. A party will not perceive the justice system as fair if it is denied the basic opportunity afforded to the other party. The playing field must be level or the administration of justice will fall into disrepute.
Trial fairness, the interests of justice and the proper exercise of the trial judge's functions under r. 17.03 of the Rules all compelled pre-trial inspection of the iPhone.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
Bell v. Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2017 ONCA 587
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
K. Armagon, for the appellant
F. Cesario and S. Kalinowski, for the respondent
Keywords: Pension and Benefits Law, Survivor Pension Benefits, Conjugal Relationship, Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8
Facts:
Shestowsky retired in February 2003 from the respondent, Ontario Power Generation, and received a pension until his death in May 2011. The pension was calculated in accordance with his representation that he did not have an eligible spouse.
After Shestowsky's death, the appellant, Bell, claimed an entitlement to survivor pension benefits on the basis that she was a "spouse" pursuant to the Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8, (the "Act") s. 1(1), which defines "spouse" as a person who, at the date of retirement, has been "living together" with the employee "in a conjugal relationship" for at least three years.
The trial judge dismissed the Bell's claim having concluded that she was not living together with Shestowsky for three years before his retirement, and Bell appealed on numerous grounds.
First, Bell argued that trial judge erred by disbelieving the uncontradicted evidence that a flood had destroyed cards and photos that supported her claim and by finding her evidence and that of her daughter and friends unreliable.
Second, Bell argued that the trial judge misapplied the law with respect to the nature of a conjugal relationship. She said he erred in: (1) relying on a cohabitation agreement signed by the parties in 2002; (2) focusing on the subjective intent of Shestowsky; and (3) relying on Shestowsky's pension election form. Bell argued that, by doing so, the trial judge misapplied the law set out in M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, which held that the elements to consider as generally accepted characteristics of a conjugal relationship may be present to varying degrees and are not all necessary.
Issues:
(1) Did the trial judge err in disbelieving the uncontradicted evidence that a flood had destroyed cards and photos supporting Bell's claim and finding that her evidence and that of her friends unreliable?
(2) Did the trail judge misapply the law with respect to the nature of a conjugal relationship?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) No. The Court of Appeal found that Bell did not identify any error of fact or misapprehension of the evidence, stating that the issues raised by Bell challenge findings of fact that were amply supported by the evidence. As such, the Court stated that those findings attracted deference.
(2) No. It was open to the trial judge to rely on the evidence to conclude that a conjugal relationship did not exist. The trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, disclosed a consideration of multiple factors which, taken together, led him to conclude that Bell and Shestowsky were not living together in a conjugal relationship for the three years before the deceased's retirement. The trial judge used the non-exhaustive criteria set out in Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), as a guideline, and, consistent with the jurisprudence, relied on objective, contemporaneous evidence. The evidence he relied on, including the cohabitation agreement signed by the parties, the respondent's letter to Shestowsky noting that his pension record showed he had no eligible spouse, the pension election form signed by Shestowsky confirming he had no spouse and subsequent confirmation letter from the respondent, and the income tax returns filed by the appellant and Shestowsky, fully supported his conclusion that Bell was not an eligible spouse for the purpose of the Act or the pension plan administered by the respondent.
Brompton Corp. v. Tuckamore Holdings LP, 2017 ONCA 594
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
J. Teskey and K. Spence, for the appellants
C.P. Naudie, A. Nanji and L. Bruschetta, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Representations and Warranties, Factual Matrix, Deference, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 SCR 633
Facts:
In 2008, Tuckamore and Brompton entered into an agreement whereby Brompton purchased Tuckamore's business in exchange for the transfer of securities held by Brompton. As a term of the agreement, Brompton made a written representation and warranty regarding tax pools in favour of Tuckamore. This was contained in section 5.1(1) of the agreement, which read:
The Purchaser represents and warrants as follows to the Vendor and acknowledges and confirms that the Vendor is relying on such representation and warranties in connection with the sale by the Vendor of the Purchased Securities:
(l) Taxes. Immediately prior to Closing and after giving effect to the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, the Purchaser will have tax pools as described in the purchaser Disclosure Letter.
As a result of the transaction, Tuckamore became a minority shareholder of Brompton. In 2010, the parties reached a second agreement to sell Tuckamore's minority interest back to Brompton. As a term of that agreement, Tuckamore agreed to indemnify Brompton for its proportionate share of any tax liabilities, including interest or penalties, assessed against Brompton under the Income Tax Act in respect of the period when Tuckamore was a Brompton shareholder (the "Tuckamore Indemnity").
After the closing of this latter transaction and after the date of the Tuckamore Indemnity, the CRA disallowed Brompton's attempted use of the tax pools to reduce its taxable revenues during the 2009-2013 taxation years. In 2015, the CRA assessed Brompton for approximately $11.8 million in additional taxes, interest and penalties. Brompton challenged that assessment in the courts, which challenge is still pending at the time of this appeal.
Following the CRA assessment, Brompton invoked the Tuckamore Indemnity to claim that Tuckamore was obliged to indemnify Brompton for its proportionate share of the assessed taxes, interest and penalties and the costs incurred by Brompton in challenging the CRA assessment. Tuckamore refused, arguing that s. 5.1(l) of the Agreement was a representation and warranty that the tax pools would be available for post-closing tax utilization. Since the CRA disallowed the use of tax pools, Brompton had breached s. 5.1(1) and could not rely on the Tuckamore Indemnity.
At issue, therefore, was the interpretation of s.5(1) – specifically, whether it constituted a representation and warranty as to the future tax utilization of the tax pools, or whether it was directed solely to the accurate identification of the tax pools in existence up to the date of closing of the first purchase transaction contemplated under the agreement.
The motion judge held that s. 5.1(1) did not give Tuckamore a representation and warranty that the tax pools would not be subject to a future tax assessment by the CRA, because it said nothing about the future use of the tax pools or how the CRA would assess them in future. The motion judge concluded that the representation and warranty was only as to the existence, amount and expiry dates of the tax pools and did not guarantee their availability for future use without the risk of a CRA assessment. Furthermore, the motion judge found that the plain language of s.5(1) suggested that Tuckamore was to be protected from the risk of misstatement of the tax pools, and not from the risk of a failed future utilization of them.
Issues:
(1) Did the trial judge err in his interpretation of the representation and warranty in s. 5.1(1) of the agreement with respect to the tax pools?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) No. Given that matters of contractual interpretation are generally questions of mixed fact and law, they normally attract a deferential standard in which an appellant must identify either a palpable and overriding error or an extricable error of law. Tuckamore failed to identify either.
The motion judge correctly used the interpretive principles found in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp to interpret the words in the contract purposively, with the intent of the parties and the full factual matrix in mind. For instance, since the agreement was negotiated by two sophisticated parties, the motion judge rightly considered the commercial context in which the agreement was concluded and the surrounding circumstances that were known or ought to have been known to the parties at the time of the contract formation. In addition, the motion judge correctly gave effect to the plain language of s. 5.1(1) when determining that the purpose of the section was to protect from the risk of misstatement of the tax pools, not from the risk of a failed future utilization of them.
Aboagye v. Atomic Energy of Canada, 2017 ONCA 598
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
F. Aboagye, in person
F. Cesario, for the respondent
Keywords: Employment Law, Wrongful Dismissal, Cause, Dishonesty, National Security, Summary Judgment
Facts:
As part of his hiring by Atomic Energy Canada, the appellant was required to obtain security clearances. It was not in dispute on this appeal that he was not truthful when he completed a "Security Questionnaire for Site Access Clearance". The form asked for an employment history and warned: "There should be no gaps...". At the time, the appellant was employed at Ivaco Rolling Mills. He did not disclose this, but indicated by email that he was unemployed.
The appellant began working for the respondent on May 15, 2012. The respondent received complaints about his harassment of other employees. He was put on investigatory leave five months later in October 2012. During an interview as part of the investigation, it was revealed that he had lied about his whereabouts when the respondent was trying to reach him to extend an offer of employment. At the time, he said he was in Africa attending his father's funeral. The appellant was terminated in December 2012.
The appellant's wrongful dismissal claim was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. He appealed.
Issues:
(1) Did the motion judge err in holding that the appellant was terminated for cause?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1) No. The motion judge's reasons were detailed, thorough and properly set out the legal principles with respect to termination for cause. The court agreed that the breach of honesty in this case went to the core of the employment relationship.
The respondent's employees had access to nuclear facilities and information vital to the security of the country. The security clearances that employees were required to pass were designed to protect national security. The court therefore found that on this basis alone, there were clear grounds for dismissal and there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.
Short Civil Endorsements
AIG Insurance Company of Canada v. Priyance Hospitality Inc., 2017 ONCA 595
[MacPherson, Cronk and Benotto JJ.A.]
Counsel:
R. Lester, for the appellant
D.S. Ward and E. Craddock, for the respondent
Key Words: Mistake of Fact, Consideration, Unjust Enrichment, Equitable Subrogation, Constructive Trust, Fraud
[Watt, van Rensburg and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
M. Halfyard, B. Vandebeek and S. Caramanna, for the appellant
A. Baiasu, for the respondent
Key Words: Child Luring by Means of a Computer, Criminal Code s. 172.1, Constitutional Validity, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ss. 11(d) and 7, Mandatory Minimums
R. v. Ismail (Publication Ban), 2017 ONCA 597
[Weiler, Hourigan and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
E. Chozik, for the appellant
M. Fawcett, for the respondent
Key Words: Arson, Sentencing, Proportional Sentencing, Collateral Immigration Consequences
[Weiler, Hourigan and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
C. Martell, for the appellant
C. Walsh, for the respondent
Key Words: Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking, Admissibility, Reasonable and Probable Grounds, Charter ss. 8 and 24(2), R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140
[Weiler, Hourigan and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
D. Doucette, for the appellant
R. Young, for the respondent
Key Words: Armed Robbery, Forcible Confinement, Breaking and Entering a Dwelling House to Commit an Indictable Offence Therein, Right to Counsel, Prosper Warning, Right to Counsel, Charter s. 10(b), R. v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236
[Weiler, Hourigan and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
M. Martin, for the appellant
S. Egan, for the respondent
Key Words: W.(D.) Analysis, Reasonable Doubt Standard, Burden of Proof, R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, Sufficiency of Reasons for Judgment
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
