Hello,
There were only three substantive civil decisions released this week. The first, Williams v. Toronto (City) is a class action against the City for negligence by tenants who occupied rooming houses in the Parkdale area of Toronto from 2003-2008. The Court of Appeal's decision contains a lengthy analysis on the legal test for finding a duty of care in negligence. The second, Thompson v. Ontario (Attorney General) is an interesting one focusing on whether Brian's Law (an Ontario statute enacted following the murder of well-known Ottawa sportscaster Brian Smith by a an individual who suffered from untreated schizophrenia), violates the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, with a particular focus on the section 7 right to liberty and security of the person. The third, Balev v. Baggot concerns the meaning of habitual residence in the Hague Convention and whether a mother's retention of her children in Canada from father in Germany, breached the father's custodial rights such that the children had to be returned to Germany.
Have a great weekend.
Lea Nebel
Blaney McMurtry LLP
Tel: 416.593.3914
http://www.blaney.com/lawyers/lea-nebel
Table of Contents:
Civil Decisions (click on the case name to read the summary)
Williams v. Toronto (City), 2016 ONCA 666
Keywords: Class Action, Rooming House, Landlord and Tenant, Duty of Care, Negligence, Standard of Care, Parkdale Pilot Project, Tenant Protection Act, S.O. 1997, c. 24 and Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006,c. 17, Cooper v. Hobart 2001 SCC 79
Balev v Baggott, 2016 ONCA 680
Keywords: Family Law, Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Hague Convention, Children's Law Reform Act, RSO 1990 c C.12, Abduction, Habitual Residence, Custody Rights, Temporary Consent, Wrongful Retention
Thompson v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 676
Keywords: Health Law, Principles of Fundamental Justice, Arbitrariness, Overbreadth, Gross Disproportionality the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 9, 10, 12 and 15, Brian's Law (Mental Health Legislative Reform), Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, Heath Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996
For Short Civil Endorsements, click here.
For Criminal Decisions, click here.
For Criminal Endorsements, click here.
For Short Criminal Endorsements, click here.
Civil Decisions
Williams v. Toronto (City), 2016 ONCA 666
[Sharpe, Lauwers and Miller JJ.A.]
Counsel:
D. Dimmer and C. J. Henderson, for the appellant
B. v. Niejenhuis and J. Safayeni, for the respondent
Keywords: Class Action, Rooming House, Landlord and Tenant, Duty of Care, Negligence, Standard of Care, Parkdale Pilot Project, Tenant Protection Act, S.O. 1997, c. 24 and Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006,c. 17, Cooper v. Hobart 2001 SCC 79
Facts:
In 2003, the Province of Ontario changed the classification of rooming houses for assessment purposes and thereby lowered the property tax rates on them. Legislation required the landlords to reduce rents payable by tenants, and also required municipalities, including the City of Toronto, to provide notices of the rent reduction to the affected rooming house landlords and tenants. The City failed to do so.
Mr. Williams, the respondent, brought a class action against the City for damages for negligence, alleging that the class members overpaid rent because the City failed to provide timely notice to the tenants. Mr. Williams and the other class members are tenants who occupied rooming houses in the Parkdale area of Toronto from 2003 to 2008. Many of Parkdale's rooming houses did not comply with municipal zoning and by-law requirements. After negotiations with affected parties, the City implemented the Parkdale Pilot Project ("PPP"), which aimed to regularize and improve illegal housing without leaving tenants homeless. The class members are tenants of buildings involved in the PPP, as defined in the certification order.
The tenants moved for summary judgment on the common issues of whether the City owed them a duty of care and whether it had breached the standard of care by failing to notify them of rent reductions. The motion judge found that the tenants' negligence claim was made out on the facts.
Issues:
The key issue in this appeal is whether the motion judge was correct in determining that the process leading to the PPP created sufficient relational proximity between the City and the class members to justify imposing on the City a private law duty of care in addition to its public obligations under the Tenant Protection Act, S.O. 1997, c. 24 and Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 ("RTA").
- Did the City owe a duty of care to class members to send the notices required by s. 136 of the Tenant Protection Act and s. 131 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006?
- Did the City, by failing to send the notices required by s. 136 of the Tenant Protection Act and s. 131 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, fall below the requisite standard of care?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
- The City owed a duty of care to class members.
- The City fell below the requisite standard of care.
Reasoning:
- As set out in Cooper v. Hobart, in order to find a duty of care in negligence, three elements are necessary: (1) the harm complained of must have been reasonably foreseeable; (2) there must have been sufficient proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant that it would be fair and just to impose a duty of care; and (3) there must be no residual policy reasons for declining to impose such a duty.
(a) Reasonably Foreseeable: Foreseeability, the first element, is not in dispute. This case turns on the second and third elements of the Cooper analysis.
(b) Proximity: The SCC determined that the starting point for the analysis is to determine whether the relationship between the parties falls within a recognized category. The motion judge held that there is no category of analogous cases in which a duty of care has previously been recognized. The Supreme Court noted in Cooper that courts have determined proximity in new situations, by "looking at expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other interests involved" in order to "evaluate the closeness of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant", and by asking "whether it is just and fair having regard to that relationship to impose a duty of care in law upon the defendant." Chief Justice McLachlin identified three types of situations where legislation could play a role in determining whether the governmental actor owes the plaintiff a prima facie duty of care (R. v. Imperial Tobacco). The proximity inquiry will focus initially on the applicable legislative scheme and secondly, on the interactions, if any, between the regulator or governmental authority and the putative plaintiff.
The motion judge was correct to find sufficient relational proximity between the class members and the City to attach to the City a prima facie duty of care. The distinctive circumstances of the Parkdale Pilot Project placed the class members in a closer relationship than other tenants in Toronto who were also entitled to receive the notices.
(c) There must be no residual policy reasons for declining to impose such a duty.
In order to oust a prima facie duty of care once the first two Cooper elements have been established, the residual policy considerations must be more than speculative. They must be compelling; a real potential for negative consequences of imposing the duty of care must be apparent. There are three significant policy considerations in this case.
- Indeterminate Liability
The Court of Appeal held that indeterminate liability was not a policy consideration on which this claim should founder. The claim is limited to the unique circumstances of the PPP and the class members. This serves to limit considerably the extent of the City's liability and confines it to a very restricted class.
2. Undesirability of inhibiting the policy-making functions of public authorities
The City is a "mere notifier" in respect of property tax reductions and associated rent reductions, like other municipalities, and it had no policy-making function in providing notice to landlords and tenants. Accordingly, this policy consideration does not weigh in favour of denying liability.
3. Imposition of liability for negligence triggering a conflict with the City's public duty
There is no basis on which the City's obligation to provide notice to landlords and tenants could conflict with any of its public duties, since the City had no policy-making function in providing the required notice to landlords and tenants. The imposition of a duty of care would complement the statutory duty, not conflict with it. This policy consideration supports the imposition of liability on the City.
- The overarching standard of care is that of a reasonable person in similar circumstances. In this case the standard is that of a reasonably competent local municipality. The City correctly pointed out that failure to comply with a statute is not itself proof of negligence. This does not preclude a court from treating the statutory requirement as relevant to the standard of care. The motion judge therefore made no error in finding that the City's failure to send the notices, without excuse, fell below the standard of care. Here, the City had a clear statutory obligation under the RTA and precursor legislation to send notices to certain tenants. The statute and regulations specify the content and timing of the notices. Meeting those specifications is what the standard of care required. The information notices the City sent to affected tenants failed to satisfy the statutory standard.
Balev v Baggott, 2016 ONCA 680
[Laskin, Sharpe and Miller JJ.A.]
Counsel:
S. M. Bookman and C. Stankiewicz, for the appellant
L. Angle, for the respondent
C. E. Tempesta and J. Stengel, for the Office of the Children's Lawyer
Keywords: Family Law, Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Hague Convention, Children's Law Reform Act, RSO 1990 c C.12, Abduction, Habitual Residence, Custody Rights, Temporary Consent, Wrongful Retention
Facts:
With a time-limited consent of the father, the mother came to Ontario from Germany with two young children, who were born in Germany, and were Canadian citizens but not German citizens. The mother remained in Ontario and refused to return the children to Germany. The application judge found that the habitual residence of the children in Germany did not change during the consensual period in Canada and ordered their return to Germany. The Divisional Court reversed that decision.
Prior to April 2013, the children had lived and attended school in Germany, with two exceptions. In 2006, the mother and children were in Canada for an undisclosed period of time, during which the older child attended school in St. Catharines. From October 2010 to January 2011, the mother and children came to Canada and both children attended school in St. Catharines during this time.
The parties separated in 2011. The father was awarded interim custody. The parties resumed cohabitation in 2012, in the same residence with the children. In April 2013, the parties agreed that the mother would temporarily take the children to Canada to attend school as an "educational exchange". The father signed a consent letter transferring physical custody to the mother for the relevant period. The mother and children arrived in Ontario on April 19, 2013, and have remained there since. The father purported to revoke his consent in March 2014. He filed a Hague Convention application in June 2014 in St. Catharines before his consent was set to expire in August 2014. He asked for an order returning the children to Germany.
The Office of the Children's lawyer became involved at the court's request to help determine the children's wishes and to represent their interests. The OCL supported the mother's position.
The application judge held that the mother wrongfully retained the children in Canada within the meaning of the Hague Convention when she refused to return them to Germany after the father's consent expired on August 15, 2014. The application judge ordered the children's return to Germany, having found that the children were habitually resident there.
On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the application judge erred in finding that the habitual residence of the children was Germany, as the habitual residence changed from Germany to Ontario during the temporary travel period. The Court held that the Hague Convention did not apply.
Issues:
Did the Divisional Court err in concluding that the habitual residence of the children had changed by the time the mother refused to return them to Germany?
Holding: Appeal allowed.
Reasoning:
Yes, the Divisional Court erred.
A judge deciding a Hague Convention application is not determining custody or deciding what would be in the best interests of the children. Rather, the judge is deciding whether a child has been abducted or wrongfully retained within the meaning of the Hague Convention. If the answer is yes, and if no exception contemplated by the Convention is present, the child must be returned to the place of habitual residence. The underlying purpose of the Hague Convention is to protect children from wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the state of their habitual residence. The Hague Convention establishes a presumption in favour of ordering the child's summary return under Article 12. If an order for return is made, it is for the courts of the requesting jurisdiction, here Germany, to determine the issue of custody.
Article 3 of the Convention provides that retention of a child is wrongful if (1) the removal or retention is in breach of the custodial rights of the applicant under the law of the state where the child was habitually resident immediately before the retention; and (2) at the time of the retention, the custodial rights were actually exercised or would have been so exercised but for the retention.
In Korutowska-Wooff v Wooff (2004), 5 RFL (6th) 104 (ON CA), the Court of Appeal held that the question of habitual residence is a question of fact to be decided based on all of the circumstances. The habitual residence is the place where the person resides for an appreciable period of time with a "settled intention" – an intent to stay in a place whether temporarily or permanently for a particular purpose, such as employment, family, etc. A child's habitual residence is tied to that of the child's custodian(s).
The Court had to determine the children's habitual residence immediately before the expiry of the father's time-limited consent, following which the mother refused to return the children.
A parent cannot unilaterally change a child's habitual residence under the Hague Convention. Absent a shared parental intention to change the child's residence at the time of the move to Ontario, the child's habitual residence remains unchanged. The application judge correctly followed that principle and found that the father remained a joint custodial parent while the children were in Ontario, despite the apparent transfer of custody in the time-limited agreement.
Ontario courts have uniformly held that a parent's consent to a time-limited stay does not shift the child's habitual residence.
The Divisional Court erred in its application of s 22(2)(b) of the Children's Law Reform Act which provides that where the parties are living separate and apart, the child is habitually resident in the place where he or she resides with one parent with the consent of the other. To apply s. 22(2)(b) to alter the child's habitual residence when the consent of the other parent is time-limited would deprive time-limited consent of any meaning. An implication of permanency needs to be read into s. 22(2). Even where a time extension is agreed to, the extension does not defeat the time-limited nature of the consent. The Court did not, however, foreclose the possibility that there may be cases where a consensual time-limited stay is so long that the child's habitual residence may change.
The mother came to Canada with two suitcases, leaving most of her and her children's belongings in Germany. The evidence from the OCL confirms that it was the children's understanding that they were coming to Canada for a "vacation". The application judge's finding was entitled to deference on appeal and there was no basis for reversing it.
The Divisional Court placed weight on the evidence that the children had settled into their new environment in Ontario. However, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada held that evidence of settling in is not relevant if the application is brought within one year of the wrongful detention or removal.
In the situation before the court, the issue of habitual residence under the Hague Convention is one for the courts of the requested state.
In terms of wrongful retention, there was a breach of the father's custodial rights. The mother's refusal to return the children to Germany deprived the father of his custodial rights under Article 3(a) of the Hague Convention. The father's consent to transfer custody for the period of the visit was not an abandonment of the father's custody rights.
Under Article 13 of the Hague Convention, even if the retention is wrongful, the court may refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. The children's objection to being returned to Germany were not substantial and did not have the "strength of feeling" required that would take the objection beyond the level of expressing a preference for one place over another.
The elements of Article 3 of the Hague Convention were satisfied. The children habitually resided in Germany immediately prior to the wrongful retention. The Retention breached the father's custody rights under German law, which were being exercised at the time of the retention. None of the exceptions under the Hague Convention apply. The children must be returned to their habitual residence.
Thompson v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 676
[Sharpe, Lauwers and Miller JJ.A.]
Counsel:
M.A. Swadron and S. M. Latimer, for the appellant Empowerment Council, Systemic Advocates in Addictions and Mental Health
R.S. Fox and S. Gordian, for the respondent
K.R. Spector and C. T. Sheldon, for the intervener ARCH Disability Law Centre
D. Morritt and V. Cotric, for the intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Keywords: Health Law, Principles of Fundamental Justice, Arbitrariness, Overbreadth, Gross Disproportionality the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 9, 10, 12 and 15, Brian's Law (Mental Health Legislative Reform), Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, Heath Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996
Facts:
Following the tragic murder of Brian Smith, a well-known Ottawa sportscaster, by an individual who suffered from untreated schizophrenia, the Ontario Legislature enacted Brian's Law (Mental Health Legislative Reform) ("Brian's Law"). Brian's Law expanded the criteria for civil committal and introduced a regime of community treatment orders ("CTOs") which provide for community based treatment and supervision for persons with past psychiatric hospital admissions. The appellants argue that Brian's Law violates several provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, with a particular focus on the s. 7 right to liberty and security of the person.
Issues:
Did the application judge err by
- (a) failing to make adequate findings on the expert evidence
and
(b) misapplying the principles of fundamental justice? - Did the application judge err in his s. 7 analysis by:
- Failing to properly consider the purpose of the legislation;
- Improperly importing s. 1 considerations into the s. 7 analysis;
- Did the application judge err by failing to find Brian's Law violates ss. 9, 10, 12 and 15 of the Charter?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
(1)(a) Did the application judge err by failing to make adequate findings on the expert evidence?
No. The application judge considered all evidence and made sufficient findings to dispose of the legal issues before him. He properly refused to make definitive findings on conflicting evidence relating to matters that were not germane to the legal issues he was required to resolve.
(1)(b) Did the application judge misapply the principles of fundamental justice?
No. Section 7 of the Charter provides: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice". A person claiming that a law is inconsistent with s. 7 must show that: (1) the law limits the person's right to life, liberty or security of the person; and (2) the limits are not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
The Attorney General conceded that the impugned provisions of Brian's Law limited the liberty and security of the person of mental health patients who were subject to involuntary commitment or CTOs. The contentious and determinative issue is whether the appellants could demonstrate that the limit on liberty and security of the person was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice?
The application judge properly focused on and made the required factual findings to resolve the critical issues that arose on the appellants' s. 7 challenge, namely, were the impugned provisions of Brian's Law arbitrary, overly broad, or grossly disproportionate.
- Arbitrariness
Bedford holds that a law will be arbitrary if there is no "rational connection between the object of the measure that causes the s.7 deprivation and the limits it imposes on life, liberty, or security of the person...A law that imposes limits on these interests in a way that bears no connection to its objective arbitrarily impinges on those interests" [emphasis in original].
With respect to arbitrariness, the application judge also found that Brian's Law increased the prospects for a better long-term outcome by minimizing prolonged delays in receiving needed treatment. Furthermore, the CTO scheme rests on similarly strict criteria, requires the consent of the individual or the Substitute Decision Maker ("SDM"), and imposes procedural protections to ensure respect for the rights of the individual.
2. Overbreadth
Legislation that is drafted more broadly than is necessary to attain its objective and thereby impinges upon a protected right or freedom may be struck down under section 7 of the Charter on grounds of overbreadth. In Bedford, the Supreme Court stated, "overbreadth allows courts to recognize that the law is rational in some cases, but that it overreaches in its effects in others."
The application judge found that the community treatment plan, which underlies the CTO, is individualized and tailored to the person's circumstances. He found that the CTO provisions set out strict criteria as to when a CTO may be issued, and include significant procedural and substantive protections.
Contrary to the submission made by the intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), the application judge's finding that CTOs "may not work for all individuals" does not establish overbreadth. Overbreadth requires that some subset of liberty infringements authorized by the impugned law be unconnected to the law's purpose. The mere fact that the law fails to fully achieve its purpose (here, "improved treatment") in some instances does not establish that, in those instances, the liberty infringement was unconnected to the law's purpose.
3. Gross Disproportionality
In Bedford, the Court pointed out that "[t]he rule against gross disproportionality only applies in extreme cases where the seriousness of the deprivation is totally out of sync with the objective of the measure".
The application judge recognized that like any therapeutic intervention, CTOs may not work for all individuals. He found, however, that research demonstrated that persons placed on CTOs are significantly less likely to be the victims or perpetrators of violence, or to be arrested or to become homeless. Given the individually tailored nature of the legislative regime and the significance of the public health objectives, the Court of Appeal determined that it cannot be said that the legislative response to the public health problem is extreme, let alone so extreme as to be grossly disproportionate.
4. Principles of Fundamental Justice: Conclusion
The legislation specifically targets individuals whose condition is such that they will, in the opinion of a physician, benefit from the application of the law to their situation in order to avoid serious mental deterioration. The application judge correctly found that the contradictory evidence in the record was insufficient to support a finding of arbitrariness, overbreadth or gross disproportionality.
(2)(a) Did the application judge err in his s. 7 analysis by failing to properly consider the purpose of the legislation?
No. The appellants submit that the public safety purpose of Brian's Law is fatal to its constitutional validity as there is no meaningful correlation between mental illness and violence. However, the Court of Appeal agrees with the Attorney General that to the extent the legislation does have a public safety purpose, that purpose cannot be viewed in isolation. It must be seen as part and parcel of an integrated scheme that promotes both improved treatment and public safety.
Next, the intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association ("CCLA") argues that that "improved treatment" cannot be a valid legislative objective because it is coerced. Although a CTO can only be made on the consent of the individual or the individual's SDM, the CCLA argues that there is no real consent as the only alternative to a CTO is involuntary committal.
The Court of Appeal rejects this argument for three reasons. First, coerced treatment may be the effect of the law in certain circumstances but it is not its purpose which the application judge properly found to be improved treatment as well as public safety. When characterizing a law for the purpose of s. 7 analysis, "the articulation of the objective should focus on the ends of the legislation rather than on its means [and] be at an appropriate level of generality". The Court of Appeal rejects the CCLA's characterization of the law's purpose.
Second, there is no constitutional ban on coerced treatment for those who lack the capacity to make treatment decisions for themselves. It is well established that where treatment would benefit an individual and the individual is incapable of making a treatment decision because of mental illness, the state has an obligation to provide care and to exercise its parens patriae authority.
Third, if the individual meets the criteria for involuntary committal, the Court of Appeal fails to see how the legislature can be faulted for offering the consensual CTO as a less restrictive option. Accordingly, Sharpe J.A. rejects the argument that consent to a CTO is effectively coerced.
(2)(b) Did the application judge err in his s. 7 analysis by improperly importing s. 1 considerations into the s. 7 analysis?
No. The appellants submit that the application judge erred by importing s. 1 considerations into his s. 7 analysis contrary to the Supreme Court's directions in Bedford. They argue that his arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality analysis, which relied on the tailored and individualized application of the law by trained medical professionals, improperly required the appellants to disprove the efficacy of the law or disprove that any benefits might flow from the law.
The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's submission. The application judge was justified in relying on the individualized nature of the regime to negate the claims of arbitrariness and overbreadth. Arbitrariness and overbreadth are, as the Supreme Court noted in Bedford, directed against the absence of a connection between the purpose of the law and its effects on life, liberty, or security of the person. This requires an analysis of the means that the law uses to achieve its purpose: Bedford. The individualized nature of the treatment is a relevant means that the application judge had to consider.
The application judge's assessment of s. 7 was entirely consistent with the approach mandated in Bedford. It did not, as the appellant submits, import s.1 considerations. As the application judge correctly found, the requirement for a tailored and individualized assessment by a trained medical professional was key to the arbitrariness and overbreadth analysis. When that feature of the law was considered, it was apparent that the appellants could not demonstrate that the limitations it imposed on their liberty and security of the person violated these principles of fundamental justice.
(3) Did the application judge err by failing to find Brian's Law violates ss. 9, 10, 12 and 15 of the Charter?
The focus of the appellant's attack on Brian's Law rests on s. 7 and their arguments relating to ss. 9, 10 and 12 of the Charter largely replicate their s. 7 arguments. Given the highly individualized and structured assessment of the individual, neither involuntary admission nor a CTO amounts to arbitrary detention under s. 9. Also, given the extensive rights notifications and procedural protections in the legislation, there is no infringement of the s. 10(a) right to be informed promptly of the reasons for arrest or detention or the s. 10(b) right to retain and instruct counsel. Moreover, the law survives scrutiny under s. 7, as it cannot amount to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment under s. 12. Further, the Court of Appeal agreed that Brian's Law does not violate s. 15(1) as discrimination on the grounds of mental disability. The individualized consideration of the individual's clinical history, past and current mental status and the likelihood of serious harm to him or herself or to others or substantial mental or physical deterioration is the antithesis of discrimination on the ground of presumed group or personal characteristics.
Finally, the Court of Appeal rejects the ARCH Disability Law Centre ("ARCH") submission that the law is discriminatory because it rests upon invalid stereotypical assumptions about the lack of capacity of mental health patients to make treatment decisions for themselves. Both the Mental Health Act and the Heath Care Consent Act give priority to the patient's views and require an individualized assessment of the patient's capacity to make treatment decisions before the patient's views can be overridden. It also rejects ARCH's contention that individualized assessment cannot be relied upon because clinical decision making may itself be infected by discrimination. That submission would require a firm factual foundation and the court below made no such findings.
Bonilla v. Great-West Life Assurance Company, 2016 ONCA 672
[Laskin, Feldman and Hourigan JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Kevin Doan, for the appellant
Keith Geurts and Barry Stork, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Insurance.
Elmgreen v. Evans, 2016 ONCA 682
[Laskin, Feldman and Hourigan JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Jens Elmgreen (via teleconference), acting in person
Richard Greene and Michael Zalev, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Civil Law.
[Gillese, Watt and Tulloch JJ.A]
Counsel:
James V. Palangio, for the appellant
Anthony Moustacalis and Daniel Goldbloom, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Fraud, Sentencing, Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture, Criminal Code, s. 462.37.
R. v. B.D. (Publication Ban), 2016 ONCA 673
[Cronk, Juriansz and Watt JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Daniel C. Santoro, for the appellant
Greg Skerkowski, for the respondent
Keywords: Publication Ban, Criminal Law, Domestic Assault, Sexual Assault, Admission of Evidence, Jury Charge, Mistrial.
[MacPherson, Pepall and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Grenville Sinclair, acting in person
Joseph Di Luca, duty counsel
Faiyaz Amir Alibhai, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal law, Sentencing, Mitigating Factors.
R. v. Sutherland (Publication Ban), 2016 ONCA 674
[Watt, Pepall and Tulloch JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Hopeton Sutherland, acting in person
Russell Silverstein, duty counsel
Michael Bernstein, for the respondent
Keywords: Publication Ban, Criminal Law, Assault Causing Bodily Harm, Sexual Assault, Theft, Breach of Probation.
[Hoy A.C.J.O., Laskin and Hourigan JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Richard Litkowski, for the appellant
Tyrone Chambers Delmar Doucette, for the appellant
Joshua Warner Christine Bartlett-Hughes, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Second Degree Murder, Aggravated Assault, Mens Rea, Aiding and Abbetting, Criminal Code, s. 21(1).
[Gillese, Rouleau, and Brown JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Paul Calarco, for the appellant
Jeremy Streeter, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Possession of Fentanyl for the Purpose of Trafficking, Breach of Recognizance, Hearsay Evidence, Curative Proviso, Criminal Code s.686(1)(b)(iii).
R. v. Suleiman (Publication Ban), 2016 ONCA 681
[MacPherson, Pepall and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Magabi Lashury Suleiman, acting in person
David Smith, duty counsel
Molly Flanagan, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Publication Ban, Prior Statement, Similar Fact Evidence, Sentencing, Aggravating Factors.
R. v. Badali (Publication Ban), 2016 ONCA 686
[Laskin, Feldman and Huscroft JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Gregory Lafontaine, for the appellant
Lucy Cecchetto, for the respondent
Keywords: Publication Ban, Endorsement, Criminal Law, Procuring Prostitution, Sentencing.
[MacPherson, Pepall and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Herbert Adams, acting in person
John J. Corelli, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Sentencing.
[MacPherson, Pepall and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Jason Bradley Gill, acting in person
Andrew Faith, duty counsel for the appellant
Geoffrey Roy, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Arrest and Detention, Criminal Code, s. 495(2).
[MacPherson, Pepall and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Fakhrolsadat Ghorashi, in person
Yoni S. Rahamin, duty counsel
Hannah Freeman, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Sentencing, Dangerous Driving, Bodily Harm.
[MacPherson, Pepall and Pardu JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Allan Mohammed, acting in person
Andrew Faith, duty counsel
Hannah Freeman, for the respondent
Keywords, Endorsement, Criminal Law, Sentencing, Immigration, Fraud.
R. v. Nicholson, 2016 ONCA 677
[MacPherson, Pepall and Pardu JJ.A]
Counsel:
Jermaine Nicholson, acting in person
Joseph Di Luca, duty counsel
Geoffrey Roy, for the respondent
Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Jurisdiction.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
