The recent Court of Appeal decision of Farnham v Prudence & Anor [2016] QCA 18 has parallels with the classic Australian movie, The Castle, in so far as both centre around the tale of a home and, to quote Darryl Kerrigan, both involved wins for ' the law of common sense '.

Importantly, in Farnham the Court of Appeal had to consider the interaction of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ('CLA') and the Workers' Compensation & Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('WCRA') to determine if an injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident on Ms Farnham's journey from her home, where she worked, to a client's house invoked the operation of the WCRA and thereby avoided restrictions to damages applicable under the CLA.

Ms Farnham was employed as a community visitor for the Commission for Children, Young People and Child Guardian. She sustained injury in a motor vehicle accident on 21 May 2012 when travelling from her home to the home of a client. In working from home she provided her own computer and car and created her own schedule but was reimbursed a travel allowance and stationary.

Liability was admitted. The central issue for the District Court and then the Court of Appeal was the calculation of quantum and whether the CLA applied to the claim, effectively limiting the damages Ms Farnham could obtain. Section 5(1)(b) of the CLA states that the CLA will not apply to an injury for which compensation is payable under the WCRA. Accordingly, the Court was required to look at whether Ms Farnham's injury was one that was covered by the WCRA. Two provisions were central.

Firstly, section 35 of the WCRA, which relates to journey claims. It states:

  1. An injury to a worker is also taken to arise out of, or in the course of, the worker's employment if the event happens while the worker –
    1. is on a journey between the worker's home and place of employment.

' Place of employment ' is defined as ' premises...or place for the time being occupied by, or under the control of management of, the employer by whom a worker concerned is employed... '. ' Home ' is defined as ' the worker's usual place of residence '.

The Court of Appeal decided the matter with reference to the plain and distinct meanings of 'home' and 'place of employment' under the WCRA. The Court said ' the mere fact that a worker does some work at home does not mean that it loses its character as the worker's home . The usual place of residence remains exactly that even thought the worker does some work there '.

Secondly, the Court considered the application of section 32 of the WCRA and if Ms Farnham had sustained an ' injury ' within the meaning of the act. Section 32(1)(a) of the WCRA defines injury as:

'Personal injury arising out of, or in the course of employment if... the employment is a significant contributing factor' .

On this point, the Court of Appeal noted the case of Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Limited [2006] QCA 48 which held that for employment to be a significant contributing factor to the injury the connection to employment must be significant and beyond that owed by one road user to another.

The Court of Appeal held Ms Farnham's employment was not a significant contributing factor and accordingly, she did not meet the definition of ' injury ' under the WCRA, so instead the CLA applied.

President McMurdo concluded ' One benefit of modern technology is that employees commonly work remotely from their places of employment, often from their homes. This decision . . . means that workers who have commenced their employment by working at home and who are then injured in a motor vehicle accident whilst driving to another part of their workplace . . . are instead subject to the more limited scheme of damages applicable under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) '.

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